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27 JULY 1989



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# ***JPRS Report***

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# East Europe

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## HUNGARY

### **Knopp Resigns Ministerial Post Following Accusations**

25000287b Budapest *MAGYAR NEMZET* in  
*Hungarian* 3 Jun 89 p 13

[Text] According to a report aired in the Hungarian Radio's Friday evening news magazine, Minister of Culture Ferenc Glatz announced that Secretary of State Andras Knopp had tendered his resignation. According to the minister, the secretary of state cited "tensions developing around my person" as the reason for his resignation.

In recent weeks, opposition organizations and movements have repeatedly pointed out that, laudable as it is to see Ferenc Glatz appointed to the head of the ministry, it was useless to expect a new spirit as long as Andras Knopp was to remain in his post. The secretary of state was formerly in charge of ideological and aesthetic issues in the MSZMP's [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party] central apparatus, and was one of those who, in the spirit of the infamous "Three T's," [tamogatas, tures, and tiltas], that is, subsidy, tolerance, and banning, most frequently resorted to silencing writers, artists, and scientists. In recent times he was a practitioner of Neo-Stalinist control. This is why there were demands calling for his departure. As his resignation brought about such a departure, creative members of our country's artistic life will obviously be greatly satisfied.

### **Solidarity Trade Union Workers Association Formed**

25000324E Budapest *MAGYAR NEMZET* in  
*Hungarian* 29 May 89 p 4

[Unattributed MTI [Hungarian Telegraph Agency] report: "Solidarity Trade Union Workers Association Formed; Rejects Marxist Theory of Classes"]

[Text] As declared at its founding meeting in the Yurt Theater last Saturday, the Solidarity Trade Union Workers Association intends to act in the spirit of solidarity when defending the rights of creative men.

The proposed fundamental regulations and program were discussed during the meeting. According to the association's program, there is a need for genuine representation and effective implementation of workers' interests, along with efforts to raise consciousness concerning societal solidarity that is indispensable under the circumstances of a developing market economy. The Solidarity Trade Union Workers Association does not wish to see the various parties carry on political work within its ranks, although it is willing to collaborate with them on certain issues related to the interests of workers. The new organization favors the withdrawal of the MSZMP from the workplace, leaving room only for production and not political activities. The workers' organizations that belong to the association reject Marxist class theory. They feel that today the activities, preparation, and especially the

political, social, and economic interests of industrial workers, peasants, and intellectuals are often identical and can be jointly represented.

Several of the speakers demanded that the central regulations concerning wages be eliminated, and that wage negotiations between the trade unions and employers be introduced. They have also spoken of a need to introduce a family-based income tax, instead of individual taxation.

Saturday's discussion also witnessed many people praising the great role played by the (forcibly eliminated) tradesman's circles and workers' associations in normal community life and lively political activities. The association plans to organize worker and tradesman clubs and self-educating circles to revive these traditions.

### **Public Opinion Poll: Outlook on Economy, Politics Worsens**

#### **MSZMP Would Win Plurality**

25000314a Budapest *HETI VILAGGAZDASAG* in  
*Hungarian* 27 May 89 pp 53-55

[Article by Laszlo Bruszt and Janos Simon: "Political Mood Assessment: The Voices of Silence"; first paragraph is *HETI VILAGGAZDASAG* introduction]

[Text] How does the average citizen of Hungarian society live with the democratization process of the Hungarian political system? Has the citizen's political thought, opinion, and conduct changed during the past years? In general: What is the political orientation, judgment, and political value choice of the "silent majority?" The authors of this article sought answers to these questions.

Diminished confidence in institutions, proclaimed principles, and leaders of a political system are an important index by which the crisis of a political system can be measured. Changes that have taken place over the past 4 years in Hungary show a drastic loss of confidence in virtually every field. Confidence in the government declined from 88 percent in 1985 to 42 percent in 1989, and confidence in the MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party] plummeted from 66 percent to 24 percent.

Between 5 and 30 April 1989 we sought the views of a thousand citizens, and received answers to about 200 questions. These were supplemented by the views of a core of some 120 persons, all of whom are within the MSZMP apparatus in leading decisionmaking positions—the so-called party elite (county party committee first secretaries, Budapest district first secretaries, CC [Central Committee] secretaries, members of the Politburo). In evaluating our research findings we used the results of a poll conducted in 1985 which in many respects was similar to the present research. The researchers included in the questionnaire some questions asked by Spanish sociologists between 1975 and 1984, and compared the results obtained there with the present results.

In 1985 a majority of the people still believed that the citizen cannot involve himself directly in decisionmaking, because decisions are made without citizen involvement, and that the paternalistic leadership takes the citizens' views into consideration and acts accordingly at least. In these days, however, only 44 percent of the people believe that Parliament is representing the people's interests (it was 66 percent in 1985). The same in regard to the MSZMP is 24 percent (66 percent), and regarding the National Council of Trade Unions [SZOT] 25 percent (60 percent). The sentiment about the Kadar era: "Without us, but for us" has transformed by now into "without us, and not even for us."

In a peculiar way, as compared to the national sample, the party leadership views the performance of the system more adversely in every respect—except for a single area: democracy in public life. In this regard 55 percent of the party leadership believes that the present situation of democracy is good, and is satisfied with it, while only 40 percent of the citizenry is satisfied with it.

There is a substantial difference between the national opinion and the party apparatus elite's views in regard to the following question: "Who, in your view, are those most dissatisfied with the present situation?" A decisive majority of the people regard miners, physical workers, agricultural workers, and engineers as most dissatisfied. At the same time, more than half of the people believe that party functionaries, policemen, and military officers are the most satisfied. In contrast, the party apparatus elite believes the opposite of what the people feel. In their view agricultural workers and small entrepreneurs are the most satisfied. Their views are also different on another pole: They profess that they themselves, the party functionaries, are most dissatisfied with the present situation (91 percent), and in the declining order of dissatisfaction they are followed by artists and writers, and subsequently by scientists and miners.

In the people's consciousness there is a sharp division between the judgment formulated on the Kadar era on the one hand, and the political representatives of that era, on the other. Compared to the Horthy era, the coalition days, the Rakosi era, and the present day, the Kadar era is remembered as a pleasant political golden age, as far as a better life, relaxed circumstances, and human equality are concerned. At the same time, the politicians of the Kadar era who are still active in public life enjoy extremely little confidence.

A majority of the people (87 percent) remember the past 2 or 3 years more like a period filled with concerns, and only 8.5 percent of the people state that results and concerns were present at the same time. As an interesting comparison it is worthy of note that in 1977, in the third year of Spanish political democratization, only 29 percent of the [Spanish] population regarded the former 2 or 3 years as a period filled with concerns.

The feeling of crisis is strong in Hungarian society, but one wonders to what causes citizens attribute the crisis situation. In 1985 a majority of the people credited concerns which struck the nation primarily to external factors, e.g. the global economic crisis, the discriminating policies manifested by Western countries. In 1989, however, the population regards the activities of national and local leaders as the primary and secondary causes of crisis, while the third place is taken by the questioning of the country's commitments in the framework of alliances. They credit results primarily to economic cooperation with Western countries. The leading party functionaries' opinions differ somewhat in this regard. In their view, reform measures played a decisive role in development, and the results may be credited primarily to reform measures, while the problems stemmed from reform measures not implemented. In the party functionaries' views the work performed by workers should be held responsible for the concerns to the least extent, and the achievement of results was least enhanced by economic cooperation with socialist countries.

A majority of the people today believe that the country would be better off with a multiparty system (65 percent) than with a single-party system (27 percent). Researchers asked the following question: "Which party would you vote for, if free elections were held in Hungary a month from now?" and enumerated nine organizations. MSZMP: 36.5 percent; Social Democratic Party: 13.0 percent; Hungarian Democratic Forum: 11.4 percent; Alliance of Free Democrats: 5.6 percent; Smallholders Party: 5.4 percent; Hungarian People's (Peasant) Party: 4.3 percent; Christian Democratic Party: 4.3 percent; FIDESZ [Association of Democratic Youth]: 2.2 percent; Ferenc Munnich Society: 0.6 percent. Respondents saying "I don't know" were omitted. In general, it may be established that a surprisingly large number of people (83 percent) selected a party for themselves, even though in response to a previous question 30 percent of those asked could not name a single alternative party, while another 30 percent were able to name one or two parties. Among other things this indicates that a majority of the voting citizens are still uncertain. They have not yet formulated an opinion; they selected primarily on the basis of traditional values and party names and not on the basis of their own values and existential circumstances.

Those voting for the MSZMP were primarily of the family provider age (35-55). A particularly high ratio of men (46 percent) between the ages of 40-50 voted for the MSZMP. This party received the least number of votes from the 20-30 age group (24 percent). Primarily the inhabitants of cities and small villages in the countryside voted for this party, while the MSZMP scored the least number of votes (25 percent) among residents of Budapest. Sixty percent of atheists voted for the MSZMP.

Even in an international comparison the view concerning politicians active in national political life is pessimistic. The populace has particularly little confidence in leaders who performed leading political functions during the Kadar era. Politicians enjoying the greatest respect are

members of the cabinet: Imre Pozsgay (69.6 percent), Miklos Nemeth (69 percent), and Rezso Nyers (61.3 percent).

In judging the events of 1956 there is a remarkable difference between the views reflected in the national assessment, as compared to the opinions of leading party functionaries. Twenty-five percent of the "silent majority" believes that there was a counterrevolution in 1956, while 24 percent believe that it was a revolution. One cannot find these extreme perceptions within the party functionary elite; only 8 percent of the respondents qualified 1956 as a counterrevolution, while none termed the 1956 events as a revolution. Twenty percent qualified it as an uprising. Both groups examined accept the term "popular uprising" in similar proportions: (31-34 percent). At the same time, 40 percent of the party functionaries accept the solution adopted in the MSZMP CC resolution: popular uprising and counter-revolution. Only 3.5 percent of the respondents representing society at large believe in this formula.

Sixty-four percent of those asked believe that during the past year the country's economic situation has worsened, 68 percent consider the country's economic situation bad, and 70 percent are counting on further deterioration in coming years. Only 32 percent of the citizenry believe that the political situation improved in 1988-89. In future years, 50 percent of the citizens expect to see improvements in the political situation.

#### One-Year Comparison

25000314a Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG in Hungarian 27 May 89 p 54

[Article by Lajos Biro and Hedvig Lehmann: "Competing Assessment"]

[Text] Researchers of the Hungarian Public Opinion Research Institute compare survey results concerning the economic and political mood of the past year. The last survey was conducted in March of this year. As in the rest of the surveys: 1,000 people were queried.

#### What Is the Present Political Mood in Hungary?

	Completely Calm	Rather Calm	Medium	Rather Tense	Very Tense	Don't Know
March 1988	1	12	33	45	3	6
May 1988	1	16	35	35	2	11
March 1989	0	3	19	56	17	5

(Responses in percentages)

#### What Best Characterizes the Hungarian Economic Situation?

	Slowdown	Stalling	Decline	Crisis	Bankruptcy	Don't Know
March 1988	4	19	27	24	15	7
May 1988	4	18	25	24	16	8
November 1988	7	29	21	22	14	5
March 1989	9	12	24	34	14	7

(Responses in percentages)

Since March 1988 the Hungarian Public Opinion Research Institute has polled people several times concerning their views on the country's economic and political situation (see tables). Twice during that period significant changes occurred in regard to the distribution of views. Between March and May of 1988 no change at all took place in this respect (the 1 or 2 percentage point changes may have occurred as a result of rounding numbers off). By November 1988 the ratio of those who characterized the economy as "stalling" had increased, and using stronger expressions (primarily "decline") had decreased. By early 1989 however, a reverse occurred: The ratio of those using the term "stalled" significantly decreased, while the ratio of persons using the term "crisis" significantly increased.

People whose highest level of education is the eighth grade used the extreme values in every survey more frequently than the average. (Budapest residents with a

lower level of education used the word "bankrupt," while those from the countryside used "slowdown.") In 1988 high school graduates agreed mostly with the term "stalling," but in 1989 their preferred terminology changed to "crisis." Persons with higher education characterized the economic situation in almost every instance by using the term "crisis."

On the basis of age groups, middle-aged persons (ages 40-60) are more critical: In March 1988, and then a year later, this age group used the term "bankruptcy" most frequently. Persons above age 60 gave preference to the term "decline" in every instance. In every survey, residents of Budapest viewed the condition of the economy in a more critical manner than persons residing in other settlements.

In March 1989 only 23 percent of those questioned counted on an improved economic situation (mostly

residents of cities in the countryside.) The ratio of those anticipating a worsening economic situation was 47. Twenty-three percent expected no change for the remainder of the year (mainly the older persons.)

In March 1988 only a plurality of those questioned (48 percent) considered the political mood tense, moreover, this ratio dropped to 37 percent following the MSZMP conference held in May. In March 1989, however, an absolute majority (73 percent) believed that the political mood in Hungary was tense.

Persons with higher education, young people, and residents of Budapest mentioned the word "tension" more often than the average, while persons with a lower level of education, older persons, and villagers used "calmness" more frequently.

Based on the last survey 53 percent of the respondents count on continued tension, and only 8 percent think that in 1989 the political mood will be calm in Hungary.

"In your view, how well are things going in the country, to what extent are you satisfied?" Only 7 percent of those asked this question expressed satisfaction, 43 percent said that they were somewhat satisfied, and another 43 percent were dissatisfied with "the way things are." Young people, persons with higher educational degrees, and city residents tend to be more dissatisfied, while older people, persons with a lower level of education, and villagers are more satisfied.

#### **Amnesty International Office Planned for Budapest**

25000288b Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 27 May 89 p 9

[Article by Gyula Hegyi: "Amnesty, or the Objectivity of the Press"]

[Text] Members of Amnesty International [AI], the human rights organization headquartered in London, have visited Budapest twice within the past few months in order to negotiate setting up the AI's Hungarian center. Since they have not encountered unequivocal rejection anywhere, they felt it would be timely to invite Hungarian citizens to join their organization as so-called international members, even before the Hungarian office was established. The organization has more than half a million members and supporters in 150 countries, and the number of its local branches exceeds 3,000. Relatively few people in Hungary know that the organization's rules prohibit members from taking any action on human rights issues in their own countries as AI members, a measure made necessary in part to protect members and in part to preserve objectivity.

In accordance with its name, Amnesty International is built on international solidarity, expecting its members to take an active stand on behalf of their fellow human beings who live in other countries and alien cultures. This means that if certain human rights infringements

were to take place in East Germany, the AI branch operating in West Germany would not feel right about taking a stand, or, as I have been told by a West German AI activist, they would not recommend that a potential Hungarian AI branch take on representing the cause of Transylvanian Hungarians. One may disagree with the idea of maintaining such high standards of objectivity under extraordinary circumstances, but one thing is certain: The success of Amnesty International is based on multiple checks on the validity of their information, a cool factuality, and the absence of any political interests.

The extent to which this is true is illustrated by a negative mirror; a selection from statements condemning AI. Amnesty International raises its voice concerning infringement on human rights in the West, in the socialist countries, and in the third world alike; as a result, it cannot count on too great a popularity in any governmental circle. Of course, the degree of animosity always depends on the given country's circumstances: There are places where AI is merely "criticized," while in other countries its activities are banned. The situation is similar when it comes to infringing on human rights: For example, in Switzerland each year no less than about 600 youths are imprisoned because they refuse to be inducted in the army; however, their sentence never exceeds 1 year, while in the Eastern European countries similar offenses call for much longer sentences. For a long time, Hungary's public was told that Amnesty International is an anticommunist organization. The intent of the following collection is to show that if there is anything with which that organization is richly blessed, it is labels:

*Israel:* "Wearing the entirely undeserved halo of impartiality, Amnesty International participates in a poisoning campaign aimed at this country (Israel), whose greatest sin is that it exists and it forms an obstacle to Soviet expansionism in the Middle East." (Suzanne Labin)

*Iraq:* "It is commonly known in Iraq that Amnesty International has a pro-Zionist attitude." (Iraq's Minister of Religion)

*Afghanistan:* "Amnesty International is a conveyor of American imperialism, its main espionage and inciting agency." (KABUL NEW TIMES)

*Guatemala:* "Amnesty International does not even try to conceal its characteristically Soviet nature." (Guatemalan government spokesman)

*Soviet Union:* "The role of coordinating the propaganda attacks against the Soviet Union is performed by Amnesty International." (Radio Moscow; true, it was in 1980)

*Mexico:* "Amnesty International is nothing more than a version of the ominous organization that was called the Hitler Jugend." (HOY)

*United States:* "Having lost its mission, it would be better for Amnesty International to remain silent, instead of providing propaganda material for PRAVDA and its ilk." (MEMPHIS PRESS SCIMITAR)

*Great Britain:* "If Amnesty International is looking for martyrs in the United Kingdom (AI spoke up on behalf of several Irish youths, imprisoned because they distributed IRA pamphlets) it would do better to think of British soldiers who were murdered in Northern Ireland."

*East Germany:* "AI's report on Portugal is excellent, but the one on East Germany is absurd: There are no political prisoners in this country." (BERLINER ZEITUNG)

*West Germany:* "Amnesty International's statement according to which in West Germany people are tried and imprisoned on account of their political convictions is without foundation." (The Office of the Federal Prosecutor)

*Australia:* "The international human rights organization called Amnesty International is simply a tool of communist propaganda." (The Prime Minister of Queensland)

*Czechoslovakia:* "The international organization called Amnesty International performs a major role in anti-communist incitement." (TRIBUNA)

*Uruguay:* "Amnesty International assumed an unequivocal stance in opposing Western nations, and it is nearly silent when it comes to atrocities committed in the communist world." (EL PAIS)

*France:* "Amnesty International is the invention of Perfidious Albion, a British organization for incitement...." (European Labor Party, Paris)

*Kenya:* "Amnesty International? Frustrated old ladies and youngsters." (Kenya's Chief Prosecutor)

## POLAND

### Press, Personnel Changes, Media Developments in February 1989

26000544 *Warsaw PRASA POLSKA in Polish*  
No 4, Apr 89 pp 56-59

[From the column "Chronicle"]

[Excerpts]

**1 February.** Andrzej Czechowicz has been named editor in chief of GLOS POMORZA and simultaneously has been removed from the position of editor in chief of POBRZEZE.

Jozef Narkowicz has been named editor in chief of POBRZEZE.

Jerzy Pantak has been named editor in chief of NASZA WIES and simultaneously has been removed from the position of first deputy editor in chief of this magazine.

Marian Rykowski has been named editor in chief of FAKTY. [passage omitted]

**4 February.** The new regional program Tele-9 prepared by the Krakow Center of Polish Television was broadcast for the first time. The new program, broadcast on the second channel, and edited in three weekly segments (entertainment, science, and socio-economic) is prepared live for nine voivodships: Krakow, Kielce, Krosno, Nowy Sacz, Przemyśl, Radom, Rzeszow, Tarnobrzeg, and Tarnobrzeg. [passage omitted]

**10 February.** The Wroclaw Section of the Club of Military and Defense Journalists of the Association of Journalists of the People's Republic of Poland organized a visit to a unit of the Northern Group of Armies of the Soviet Army. During the visit to the Soviet armored unit, the journalists learned about the history and achievements of the unit and observed the training of future tank crews. The journalists also met with Lt Valeriy Vishnevski, who fought in Afghanistan. [passage omitted]

**14 February.** In Warsaw there was a meeting of journalists of the ethnic press. Journalists of the magazines AUSRA, FOLKS-SZTYME, NASZE SLOWO, NIWA, and ZIWOT participated in the meetings. They decided to form a Club for Ethnic Problems within the Association of Journalists of the People's Republic of Poland.

**15 February.** Jan Wysokinski has been named editor in chief of the National Publishing Agency. [passage omitted]

**17 February.** In Gdynia, a two-day session of the Maritime Journalists' Club of the Association of Journalists of the People's Republic of Poland ended. The first day the maritime journalists were the guests of the first day the Maritime Company which was celebrating its 50th anniversary. During the past five years the rate of growth of sales in Baltona's domestic export stores has increased 15-fold. Such a partner is worth having, and the Main Board of the Association of Journalists of the People's Republic of Poland, which in conjunction with Baltona intends to promote auctions of works of art, has already thought of this point. [passage omitted]

**22 February.** The Palace on the Water in Lazienki Park was the site for the Wiktor'88 Awards of Polish Television and ZYCIE WARSZAWY for the most popular television characters. Among the winners were the journalists Krzysztof Bartnicki, Aleksander Malachowski, Karol Sawicki, and Jerzy Waldorff.

**22 February.** In Warsaw, the Socio-Legal Journalists' Club of the Association of Journalists of the People's Republic of Poland organized a meeting with Wojciech Tomczyk, head of the Foundation To Aid Crime Victims and his coworkers. [passage omitted]

**24-26 February.** The General Assembly of the Federation of Trade Unions of the Publishers and Agencies of Prasa-Ksiazka-Ruch Workers' Cooperative Publishing House met. The federation elected new officers. Zdzislaw Derbich was again elected chairman of the Federation Council.

**27 February.** In Warsaw, the Aviation Journalists' Club of the Association of Journalists of the People's Republic of Poland organized a meeting with Katarzyna Tomaszewska, the director of the Warsaw office of the American airline Pan Am, who told the journalists about Pan Am's operations in Poland and elsewhere. [passage omitted]

**28 February.** In Warsaw at the Journalists' House, the Youth Issues Club of the Association of Journalists of the People's Republic of Poland organized a meeting with specialists in the problems of the younger generation in Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, and Hungary.

### Supplement

In the previous issue, the chronicle of personnel changes made in the press in January 1989 did not contain all the reports. Below we print a supplement to the previous chronicle.

**1 January.** Tadeusz Myslik has been given the duties of editor in chief of ODRODZENIE.

Krzysztof Nerc has been named deputy editor in chief of ZARZEWIE.

### Association Law Praised as Example of Mutual Trust, Democracy

26000533 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish  
10 May 89 p 3

[Article by Jan Brodzki: "Association Law Is a Public Cause"]

[Text] The creation of the Association Law, which was passed by the Sejm a month ago, has been described in debates, reports, and general sentiment as "unprecedented," "a legislative phenomenon."

These are accurate descriptions. I think in the history of our parliament, there has been no law of such fundamental significance, the preparation of which clearly and compactly combined so many significant elements: universality of popular approval for initiating legislative work on the draft of the new law; the tempo of the work once the decision to undertake it has been made; lack of conflict between that pace and the accuracy of execution; merging of the efficiency of execution technique with the broadest conceived democracy at all stages of creation.

The belief in the necessity to replace a legal act dating back scores of years, deriving from another political era that is anachronistic in various expressions and solutions in regard to the present and future demands of our sociopolitical life, and in regard to the requirements of democracy, has been growing for a long time. The Ninth Extraordinary Party Congress gave a decisive impetus for seeking the most accurate forms of our Polish socialist rebirth in all spheres, and the Tenth Congress increased this impetus; the plenary sessions of the Central Committee concretized the strategy and tactics of paving the way for democracy. It is precisely in that

trend that the possibility matured to realize even those aspirations associated with giving up the old Association Law. The motions of the PRON [Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth] Congress decisively supported this idea. In the appropriate Church manner, resolutions of the plenary conferences of the Episcopate were associated with this theme.

Why did I regard as purposeful the use of the expression "the possibility matured"? The fact of the matter is that the Association Law—the concretization of very important constitutional records from the sphere of civil rights and freedoms—could and ought to have been prepared in an atmosphere of nascent popular agreement, as the evident expression of the formation of sociopolitical pluralism, and as the expression of deepening democracy, which cannot function without order, social discipline, and peace. Every legal act associated with the problems of civil rights and freedoms arouses understandable, special public interest, which is conspicuous in a variety of views, opinions, and often, expressions of emotion. The elaboration of such an act as the Association Law required an aura of mutual trust of the authorities representing various orientations, the desire for calm discussion, seriousness and willingness to arrive at as far reaching a consensus as possible on attempts at organization by these or other responsible elements during times of unrest or turmoil.

Speeding up the maturation of the circumstances enabling decisive work on the draft law to be undertaken by the government and Episcopate sides regarding a joint effort in this sphere, was a sign of political wisdom, an example of political culture—and also, a revelation of a kind.

With a 3:3 "parity" of government and lay representatives of the Episcopate, work was begun on the draft. It was no idyll; these were difficult political and legal discussions, significant, however, in that the views ran in the same direction in relation to the goal, the general form of the law and its basic solutions; whereas, in relation to some essential solutions and details (as is known, disagreements about details many a time can destroy the most ingenious general draft), they disputed as a matter of principle, but patiently and objectively, seeking points in common, treating a change of personal position on a concrete question not as a defeat, but as a way to agreement.

Were all the disputed issues settled by the group? No. They prepared the draft of the law in such a way that disagreements that arose appeared clearly in certain variants of the by-laws. Press reports, including those in TRYBUNA LUDU, accurately represented the area of disagreement, so that I need not use examples.

This variant draft of solutions for the Association Law was subject to the power of the agreements and decisions of a very broad public state consultation. In the month's time allotted for the consultations, numerous opinions unexpectedly flowed in to the Sociopolitical Committee of the Council of Ministers. The opinions came from



both eminent experts on the issue, who were asked to express an opinion about the proposed draft, and from a mass of volunteer respondents—experts, as well as citizens, who simply wanted to share in shaping the most useful solutions for democracy. They expressed opinions that generally pertained to the law's draft, and also opted for certain variants of solutions, and that's not all: they also proposed their own drafts. The mass transfer media have devoted much attention to these problems through the voices of readers, television viewers, radio listeners, and journalists.

It is worth mentioning that numerous social, religious, professional, creative, and scientific organizations, and numerous companies, associations and clubs participated very actively in expressing their views. It was truly a festival of civic commitment.

Obviously, well-organized work was necessary in order to "catalog" and properly consume in consecutive stages this splendid product of social activity—being the response to the democratic decisions on the style of the draft's preparation.

Precisely such a significant change—as far as its democratic nature—were the discussions on the controversial problems of the draft and the mutual forging of many agreements by the government-coalition and the Solidarity-opposition sides during the roundtable talks, and the molding of the draft into such a shape that it was characterized by only a trivial amount of divergence. In presenting the draft to Laska Marszałkowska [Sejm], the government was aware (very forcefully, I think) of the fully socialized process of the origin of the Association Law's draft. The Special Commission called by the Sejm was guided in its work by the whole course of the previous activities, and then also by the opinions of the Socioeconomic Council and the group of Sejm advisors. Not many of the proposed changes in the submitted draft resulted only from the will for consolidation; rather a more accurate statement of the solutions constitute, in essence, a large part on the way to formation of a civil society in Poland.

What does the acceptance by the Sejm of the Association Law signify? It signifies the creation of conditions for full realization of the freedom of the people to organize, as guaranteed by the Constitution and in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human and Civil Rights and the International Pact of Civil and Political Rights; it signifies the rendering to the people of the equal right to participate actively in public life, regardless of convictions, to express different views, and to realize individual interests; it signifies the taking into account of the tradition and universally recognized work of the association movement.

What does the style of work on this particularly important law signify? It signifies the decisive will to initiate democratic institutions for the broadest possible use of

the intellectual potential and commitment of the people, and their political and professional experience in the service of society.

It is true that the approaching elections assure a parliamentary composition and structure that is very responsive to the profile of national political orientations. Therefore, obviously, reason dictates that the need for such commitment of social activity will not exist in every legislative act. However, whenever there is such a need, we must satisfy it.

### **Polish-Soviet Education Cooperation Expanded, Described**

26000572 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish  
7 Jun 89 pp 1, 3

[Article by (par): "Cooperation in Education: First Session of Polish-Soviet Commission; Comments by Minister Viktor Zubaryev to ZYCIE WARSZAWY"; includes brief interview with Min Zubaryev, date and place not given]

[Text] The first session of the Polish-Soviet Commission for Cooperation in Education began on 5 June in Warsaw. On Tuesday was signed a joint protocol indicating the fields of education and science that will be of the greatest interest to the Commission in the near future.

These fields include professional training (the need to improve the conditions of the exchange of students and scientists, and especially to provide them with broader access to state-of-the-art scientific equipment and to archival materials was acknowledged to be among the most important problems), the development of social sciences, upgrading the qualifications of teachers, including also experts in Polish and Russian language instruction, and expanding the cooperation between schools on both sides of the frontiers and schools for national minorities. Resuming the activities of a commission focusing on comparative analyses of history textbooks was acknowledged to be a highly urgent task. The protocol also notes that it should intensify its activities. The Commission for Cooperation itself is devoting considerable attention to such matters as establishing direct contacts between youth of both countries and making traditional contacts less formal.

The Commission is co-chaired on the Soviet side by Professor Viktor I. Zubaryev, deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for National Education, and on the Polish side by Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of National Education, Dr Zbigniew Sajkowski. I asked Minister Zubaryev to grant me a brief interview on the objectives and problems with which the Commission will deal. He said, among other things:

[Zubaryev] The cooperation so far has been pursued by various ministries attending in the USSR and Poland to problems of professional training and instruction. Now the systems for administering education in both countries have been reformed and it is natural that both the

Soviet and the Polish ministries of education will have to take a closer look at what we have been doing so far and at the new prospects being unlocked. An exchange of information on the reforms being carried out as well as on the reforms being planned in the educational system revealed that both in Poland and in the Soviet Union we are proceeding in the same direction. A broadening of cooperation and exchange of mutual experience is thus useful and necessary.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] What does this mean, "We are proceeding in the same direction"?

[Zubaryev] The democratization, humanization, individualization, and computerization of education are precisely the basic directions of changes at every educational level. Another important objective is to search for and identify gifted students. On comparing the situation in both countries, it seems to me that we are slightly ahead of you in resolving some problems.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] In what ways, chiefly?

[Zubaryev] This concerns matters such as augmenting the student's responsibility for the learning process and the teacher's responsibility for the quality of the information he conveys, and also abandoning the still too formalistic evaluations of instructional results. I also believe that we have been more successful than you in enhancing the prestige of teaching. But let me also say that we are only slightly ahead, perhaps by a year, in this respect.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] The Commission's session culminated in signing a joint protocol. What decisions in that protocol do you think the most important?

[Zubaryev] Since both our countries are engaged in reforming their educational systems, anything that helps us compare the directions of our reforms and exchange experiences is highly important. But in addition to general or, let me say, institutional solutions, I also view as important the decisions concerning the cooperation in the teaching of social sciences. This concerns both teaching methods and the solution in theory of the problems currently arising in connection with the changes occurring in our countries. A new direction of action is the exchange of students at all educational levels. Previously this exchange was limited to university students. On the occasion, let me also say that we shall try to increase the number of Soviet students in Poland. We also view as an urgent task the broadening of cooperation in the training of interns and doctoral students. A related problem is establishing closer contact with Polish graduates of Soviet higher educational institutions, with the object of, among other things, upgrading their qualifications. There are about 20,000 such graduates working in Poland, and we must consider the forms of future contacts with them. Lastly, still another major problem is joint scientific research, pursued chiefly under the plans for scientific-technical cooperation of CEMA countries. We believe that the number of topics of such research can be greater than it has been so far.

#### **Foundation for Personnel Advancement Seeks International Contacts**

26000575b Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish  
2 Jun 89 p 5

[PAP report: "Polish Foundation for Career Advancement Established: Opportunities for Growth and Advancement"]

[Text] At the State Notarial Office in Warsaw a founding group has notarized a declaration to establish the Polish Foundation for Career Advancement.

Some founding capital has already been obtained. The goals underlying this initiative were discussed by Deputy Director of the Personnel Policy Department under the PZPR Central Committee Eugeniusz Bandosz:

"We intend the steps to be taken by this foundation to provide the political and organizational conditions for the personal growth and advancement of the best-qualified individuals. This means promoting the advancement of young people who distinguish themselves in science or in work, especially talented and innovative Poles, to executive positions in the government, in education, in culture, in health service—in a word, in the entire society.

"The new, broadly educated cadres will be prime movers of progress and modernity. The foundation will operate a 'personnel data bank.' It will focus especially on the future intellectual and leadership elite of our country.

"In a word, the foundation is to assist individuals in developing their predispositions and skills for executive positions, and it also is to provide orientation to applicants for competitive job positions, and to this end it will employ diverse methods.

"Other purposes of the foundation will include personnel training, assistance in advancement, keeping track of career progress, popularization of successful individuals, organization of international cooperation in career advancement, the conduct of studies and research, and promotion of the idea of the modern manager.

"After the foundation is registered in a court and obtains adequate office space, as of 1 July we intend to commence carrying out the goals of the foundation's charter."

#### **Militia Commander Denies Rumors of Privileges, Notes Shortages**

26000562 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish  
26 May 89 p 6

[Statement by Gen Bde Zbigniew Nowicki, deputy chief commander, Citizens Militia [MO]; first two paragraphs are ZYCIE WARSZAWY introduction]

[Text] The opinion has been held for a long time that service in the Citizens Militia is rewarded with "extraordinary" salaries and MO functionaries benefit from social and living privileges unavailable in other professions.

Do such statements correspond to reality? This question was asked of Gen Bde Zbigniew Nowicki, deputy chief commander of the Citizens Militia.

"The cadre situation in our department," he stated, "is generally speaking very difficult. We have more than 4,300 vacant posts in the country whereas locally, the situation is downright tragic in this respect. For example, in Warsaw, we are 2,000 militia functionaries short; in Katowice—approximately 1,000; and 500 short in Szczecin. These examples, especially those involving large urban centers, could be continued much further.

"The reasons for cadre shortages are very complex. However, they were caused, above all, by four basic factors. First of all, the financial status of functionaries, which is not capable of competing with many other occupations or professions. A newly hired militiaman receives 88,500 zloty as his initial pay. If he has a higher education, he receives 94,000 zloty as a starting salary.

"It takes 10 years of service for a rank and file militiaman to 'work his way' to a salary of 105,000 zloty. A district militiaman with the same number of work years behind him currently makes 115,000 zloty whereas an MO officer makes 145,000 zloty after 10 years of service.

"When these amounts are compared with the salary rates of quite a number of 'civilian' work establishments, the conclusions are most probably unequivocal. Recently, I spoke with the RUSW [Regional Office of Internal Affairs] chief in Kedzierzyn-Kozle. Interviews were conducted with 10 candidates for militia service. Not one of them had been previously making less than 140,000 zloty of whom four were blue-collar workers with salaries in the 300,000 zloty per month range. Therefore, what sort of competitiveness can we talk about here?

"A second cause are our capabilities of providing for the social-living needs of the functionaries.

"Currently, there are 22,000 of them in the entire country waiting for housing. It may seem that this number is not very high but, for example, in Warsaw there are approximately 3,100 functionaries waiting for individual apartments.

"In practice, it is impossible to even determine the prospects of implementing these needs. By way of example, last year the SUSW [Capital (Warsaw) Office of Internal Affairs] allocated or obtained scarcely 220 apartments for its functionaries.

"Our vacation-recreation base, which is so frequently given as an example of benefits for the 'privileged,' is limited. It suffices to say that during a 35-year period of service, an MO functionary takes advantage of it an average of three times.

"The situation is similar with our department's hospitalization service. If in the civilian health service there are

55 beds for every 10,000 residents, the ministry of internal affairs has scarcely 37 for the same number of people.

"The difficulties in cadre recruitment are also the result of our working conditions. I do not want to be the one to complain about the 'technology' of militia service which requires the highest degree of service readiness about which we ourselves say that this is 'work at constant attention.'

"However, if I say that we urgently need stations for more than 700 regional militia units, then this is, I would think, the best testimony of the extent of shortages.

"Many militia buildings require immediate repairs and as a matter of fact, many of them should be immediately banned from use.

"The shortage of transportation means makes itself felt very acutely. We estimate that we are short approximately 360 patrol vehicles, that is, vehicles which we assign for patrol and intervention purposes.

"We have significant shortages in the area of communication means. Forty percent of the basic MO units (i.e., militia stations) do not have teletype service or intradepartmental communication systems. In terms of set standards, only 60 to 80 percent of our office-housing needs are provided for.

"Another reason for cadre shortages in the MO ranks are also strict criteria for the selection of functionaries. Besides good health, and an irreproachable past, we require candidates to have a proper education. We assume that for noncommissioned officers' posts this should include at least secondary schooling and for officers—higher education.

"Unfortunately, in practice we are often forced to lower the education qualifications standard. Obviously, the raising of qualifications at a later point within the adult education system limits a functionary's availability for performing his work duties.

"In this situation, the question of whether the number of MO functionaries in our country is not too high, I would think, should be regarded as rhetorical. Not counting ZOMO [Motorized Detachments of the Citizens Militia] subunits or similar units in other countries, there are 170 militiamen for every 100,000 residents in Poland, whereas in France, for example, there are 309; in the FRG there are 280, and in the U.S. and Great Britain 260."

"We realize," stated the MO deputy chief commander, "that recently the Citizens Militia has found itself in a kind of 'spot.' Proposals are being made to limit the means that are at our disposal.

"It is difficult not to notice that such voices are reverberating against a background of political struggle and also in the face of the approaching elections. Demagogic slogans that, for example, demand the suspension of the expansion of the MSW [Ministry of Internal Affairs]

Central Clinical Hospital which, after all, also admits patients from outside the department and, above all, one that is being rebuilt with the MSW's own efforts, are not lacking in this campaign. They [slogans] are even being voiced by health service representatives who are part of the political opposition.

## YUGOSLAVIA

### **Budva LC Leader Interviewed on Montenegrin, Other Issues**

28000140 Belgrade MLADOST in Serbo-Croatian  
9 May 89 pp 15-17

[Interview with Budva League of Communists leader Svetozar Marovic by Rasko Kovacevic: "We Want the Right to Our Story"; date and place not given]

[Text] Svetozar Marovic is 34 years old, and is virtually the oldest of the inner circle of the "Montenegrin anarchists" who are actually establishing a new model for political and social conduct in Montenegro. He participated in the preparation of materials for the 10th Extraordinary Congress of Montenegrin communists (Tempo said of those materials that they were the only party documents that he had read with satisfaction during the postwar period). He is currently the president of the Executive Council of the Budva SO. He has a degree in philosophy.

[MLADOST] What do you recognize as a serious democratic impulse in Yugoslavia, which provides a real chance for us to reach democracy in the foreseeable future?

[Marovic] First of all, I think that now is the time of an obvious emancipation from ideological and theoretical determinism, or, rather, from ideological and theoretical terror. That means that the eschatological communist idea, undoubtedly based on Neo-Darwinism, has now been dispossessed; it consequently can no longer burden our thought and political reality. This is particularly important because that was one of the most totalitarian ideas, viewed historically, which as such was directly aimed against democracy.

As we know, the basic principles of that idea are instrumentalized in the so-called Hegelian triad—criticism of what exists, a transitional period, and the goal (thesis, antithesis, and synthesis), which means that the socialism in which we live according to that scenario is only a transitional stage, or a historical instrumentalization of the fulfillment of the messianic idea which we are all awaiting with religious hope. As Kosev said, that idea has resulted in everyday reality being made profane and marginal to the point of all sorts of clumsiness, and has resulted in actual legal existence only being possessed as that everyday reality which is placed at the service of the metaphysical reality. Specific people, specific relationships, and specific instruments have been a decoration, and in the final analysis, an extraneous matter for an idea of a priori Marxism.

[MLADOST] That is the theoretical impulse. What has it led to in practice?

[Marovic] On the basis of such a critical distance, there has been an expansion and intensification of critical options with respect to the above theoretical concept in the sphere of ideology as well; these critical options specifically mean restoration of the dignity of the real or Machiavellian truth (in the sense that Machiavelli is the author of modern political theory, in which politics is constituted inductively, in contrast to ancient classicism, in which ideal models are produced). That is also a restoration of the authority of everyday reality.

It also appears significant to me in this regard that on the basis of these principles we have obviously come to realize that models of socialism (including any potential model of ours) are only meaningful if they promote the existence of an authentic democratic public. That furthermore means that if, in theoretical terms, we already have a critical attitude toward such a communist idea, the practical response to such an attitude is ensuring the autonomy of everyday reality in which social, political, and cultural differences and differences in customs will be legally protected in their demand to express themselves and participate in the formation of the societal essence, the social situation.

[MLADOST] Does this mean that many civil rights that so far we have had more or less as decoration must be made much clearer?

[Marovic] It is necessary to establish a democracy and a political public, in such a way that there will be legal activation of the right to the freedom of political association, the right to struggle to achieve political dignity and thus create a drama of political and social dynamics in which the LC [League of Communists], from its a priori, vanguard position, will arrive at the ground of real relationships, in which it will try to build real political legitimacy instead of a metaphysical legitimacy. Such processes are already taking place, and they are an expression of the existential need to have a free choice of one's political and social commitment. After all, these are elementary human needs.

### **Law and Democracy**

[MLADOST] You mentioned the LC. Since it is still the strongest political force, and will remain so for a long time to come, it is important to break down its present assumptions and authorities. Is that at all possible, in a serious and broad sense, here and today?

[Marovic] There is undoubtedly a demand in that regard. The LC is built on the principles of adopting a deterministic model of social development and ignoring a democratic public; it has thereby built a controlling and supervisory role with respect to society or above society, using this to demonstrate, on one hand, its courageous political alternative, and on the other hand, as a material or instrumental force for achieving its goal. And you see such an LC in Montenegro, for instance, announcing

that it is ready, for the first time in the political history of Yugoslavia, to enter into a real political relationship and a real political competition.

I am not certain that the LC will be ready for anything like that throughout Yugoslavia; I am afraid that it certainly will not be; but I am convinced that sooner or later it will have to aim for that, since otherwise this community will not have many prospects of liberating itself from its present servitude, at least for the foreseeable future.

[MLADOST] Can all of this that you have recognized as significant democratic impulses be achieved at all without prior institutionalization of the institution of citizen, that is, without first guaranteeing the principle of one citizen, one vote?

[Marovic] Naturally, the main thing is to ensure the legal verification of democratic impulses. Without a constitutional and legal guarantee of civil rights and freedoms, and the resulting obligations, this entire story will always be left up to the actual discretionary political authority of those in power, who, citing higher political reasons, will pass judgment and intervene in certain relationships. Accordingly, it is clear that our current political alternative, i.e., the ambition for us to be a modern society—and I hope that is our ambition—can by no means overlook the things that you are talking about.

[MLADOST] To date we have had certain legal guarantees, in the Constitution and elsewhere.

[Marovic] This is certainly not just a question of bare normativistic achievements, but also of the need for emancipation as well from those famous observations that Bolshevized the communist mind. In accordance with that revived maxim of Plekhanov's that revolutionary law is the supreme law, the position has also been formulated that law is a decadent thing, and that it was invented by some bourgeois theoreticians, all in order to keep the working class in its state of actual and legal servitude, i.e., exploitation. Therefore, we do not need law, the Bolsheviks say, we only need to have revolutionary awareness and revolutionary action, and that implies an active political leadership and an active political establishment, nothing more.

Consequently, it is obvious that the new social reality also implies liberating ourselves from these communist-Bolshevik concepts; one must rely on the law and a lawful state in which individuals and collectives will be protected from terror and insecurity of any type.

### Politics of the Community

[MLADOST] Within the framework of the previously described sophistries, we have had for a long time, and still have, the right to a different opinion?! Look, have we been given the right to think differently?

[Marovic] What is the right that proves or ensures that a person has a right to think differently? That is nonsense.

The basic right is not and cannot be the right to a different opinion, since if that were not the case, we would have to deal with despotism and a proclaimed tyranny. Consequently, it is a question of your having the right to organize your opinion in such a way as for it to become an alternative for those who are willing to communicate with you rationally, and possibly accept the value of your arguments.

[MLADOST] There are authoritative views that the point on which one can distinguish those who support democracy from those who do not is precisely that attitude toward the principle of "one citizen, one vote," in which case the right to minority interests must also be protected. In the current Yugoslav options (the most dominant ones are the Slovene and Serbian options), that principle is not mentioned at all. The former are allegedly afraid of majority tyranny, while the latter do not need that principle because they have plebiscitary support. What is your opinion?

[Marovic] Undoubtedly, in a federal system like ours we have to have both principles. Nevertheless, all forms of devaluing the individual, whether justified by national sovereignty, fear of majority tyranny, or some general communist generality, mean a return to the original conservative political alternative which can be recognized in this well-known position: the collective must be superior to the individual. We know, however, that it is precisely the individual who must be a factor in constituting the community. Politics as an alternative has meaning only if it functions as a politics of the community. That is why any story that does not respect the individual is actually a story of further proclamation, as the supreme principle, of the principle of the collective's domination of the individual.

[MLADOST] Your documents say that pluralism is, naturally, a necessity, but that for the time being you support pluralism within the framework of the Socialist Alliance, i.e., within the framework of the still existent political monopoly. Is pluralism in the true sense possible at all within any framework?

[Marovic] That story of pluralism today appears to me to be two radically different options. According to one, pluralism is something apocalyptic, a second solution for this country, which will bring it evil and against which all possible war machinery must be mobilized. Allegedly, pluralism as such also means a potential danger to some primeval, authentic socialism. According to the second option, pluralism is perceived almost as some metaphysical good which can extract us a priori from all difficulties, and accordingly it is only necessary to commit ourselves to it and immediately things will be better. Both versions are advocated by those who either do not understand politics or think that it is a simple job. Politics, however, is a social relationship, a social process during which one must also give answers to the questions you have asked yourself.

And now, there are several possibilities, in addition to those principled ones (the right to freedom of opinion, to freedom of association, etc.), which need to be worked out. Should the LC conduct some sort of minority multiparty competition within the Socialist Alliance, which will result in a victor, which should be promoted through the Socialist Alliance into a holder of power? Or, in another version, will the LC be outside the Socialist Alliance, and will the Socialist Alliance itself be an alliance of socialist coalitions that could be an opposition to the LC in a possible competition? And so on...

My views on pluralism at this time have their point of departure in something that could be called a transition from intermediary to participative democracy. Naturally, all the options have to come into play, but it seems to me that a multiparty system as a pluralistic alternative, not from the communist point of view but rather the modern concept of the requirement that contemporary people want to participate more in social events, and to have more influence over their own destiny—is not the most suitable version. Why?

Parties, as a rule, mean a definite and fairly effective formula of an activated political-intermediary variant in which you have general political representations, which think about your problem on your behalf and which more or less keep you at the level of political adolescence. In that sense I have certain reservations about that version, although I am not, if I may repeat myself, opposed a priori to a pluralist option. If such a general relationship comes it will offer first of all an intermediate democracy, and thus make possible to begin manipulating the citizens, as the basic elements of all possible democratic options.

#### New Models Needed

[MLADOST] You, then, prefer a possibility which means the end of traditional politics, in which such politics is kept only within certain general political projects and in orienting the public with respect to those projects. What about everyday political business?

[Marovic] Traditional politics can no longer be activated through such business, and we have already partially explained why. New models are needed here. I favor an inductive approach which respects reality and out of it builds a general projection, which is consistent with precisely all social movements which, on one hand, can contribute to prolonging the legitimacy of official policy, and on the other, can anticipate the possibility of direct political decisionmaking. It is precisely in that direct decisionmaking that I see the possibility of political pluralism—which will make it possible for people to participate in all vital issues that affect their social and political life.

And there is something else in connection with the multiparty option: it is to some extent efficient and rational, but it seems to me that we must try to intimate the logic of the mass social conglomerations which, as a rule, leads to greater significance for the intermediary.

We must try to intimate that logic directly to certain Hellenistic needs—so that regarding certain truly vital social issues we can reconstitute a human community as a community that has a feeling of mutual belonging, and which will moreover respect the value of the individual, although naturally not as an absolute. That implies that you have legally guaranteed instruments (a referendum, public struggles, participation, etc.) through which you will fight for your goals. Those instruments cannot be just a decoration, or a way to exert pressure on an establishment that may consider your goals, but does not have to; they must be a legally guaranteed form of adopting official decisions. That is the different with respect to what we now have in multiparty versions in the West; there people gather, go out onto the street, and demand the elimination of a nuclear power plant, for example, but this always has to do with what we may call the relationship between marginalized social alternatives and the official, dominant one. The official dominant one can take into account such demands, more or less, if that helps to ensure further legitimacy for its social management, or not take them into account if there is no danger to that legitimacy. In other words, there the authentic opinion is mainly a corrective factor, but the point is that we have to strive for a position that will ensure participation in the production of official policy.

#### Manufactured Lack of Culture

[MLADOST] Where do you see the greatest danger to the existing truly democratic impulses that have been formulated in Montenegro? In this regard, I am not thinking of the easily perceived dangers that are already coming and will come from the defeated bureaucratic forces.

[Marovic] There are two major difficulties that await us. The first is this catastrophic economic and social situation, which simply does not allow patient work over the long term; there is thus not much time. That situation is a burden and is producing anxiety; it is also producing a story about democracy as some primeval freedoms, but that story can also be understood as some sort of snobbish, decadent political term used by some insufficient intellectuals, who are offering something in order to grab power.

The other difficulty is the one that can be explained by Fromm's famous sociopsychological analysis, which shows, as confirmed by my experience, that a person is terribly willing to flee from the right to freedom. The flight from freedom has become a psychological constant that is also giving us a bitter warning. We know that in human nature there is a pronounced narcissistic dimension, which man usually satisfied through collectivist visions of success. Socialism and communism are two forms of those visions. In any case—I am myself slightly repelled by that human trait—even when he wins freedom, he easily surrenders it, taking into account some sort of rationality. I am afraid, because 40 years of an inactive democratic political culture have directly resulted, as Djindjic says, not in some antipode of culture, but rather in an implicit or alternative political

nonculture, which has its own norms, its own legality, its own composition, and its own values, which indicate that one should only commit oneself to some active leadership, to some new leadership. Such a commitment, even if to our present leadership, cannot be good.

[MLADOST] What are your private expectations from the extraordinary congress of the Montenegrin party?

[Marovic] I must confess that they are quite high. But not in the sense of those pathetic observations like: it is a historic event, exceptional, etc.; instead, they are high because for the first time in official communist normativistics room is being opened up for non-taboo, free opinions on our reality and our prospects.

In the congress documents, we mentioned three things that I think are very important: the affirmation of society, and the restoration of authority, which has been systematically and finally lost in the end; we also mentioned the establishment of the political public and the democratization of the LC, so that the latter could finally become a modern organization that must take into account everything that is modern and good in the world.

Those rational demands of ours are being criticized for being utopian, but that is incorrect, since our rationality is utopian in comparison with the idea of communism, which is metaphysical. According to that eschatological logic, communism cannot thwart anything that is rational, and so any rationality is declared to be utopian. Communism has been promoted as an idea which controls itself, since as the vanguard part of the proletariat it cannot be controlled by that proletariat, and since it is the vanguard, it is beyond any cognitive ability and empirical verification. We are now really trying to inaugurate a rational attitude in which all cognitive means of verification must be used. I would say that this is a great innovation for the communist movement in Yugoslavia.

I consequently think that our project is really progressive, among other things because it says: people, be free, do what you think you should do in order for things to be better for you, while we, maintaining that we are one of the parts of the democratic public, will always have our own alternative and our own means of achieving it. You, depending upon your confidence in us and our ideas, will either be with us or not. Our idea is thus to some extent also a holistic one: it wants to perceive society as a whole, as an entity, and its own place within it.

#### Without Crossing Out Names

[MLADOST] In order to accomplish that innovation, or rather, in order to have a real chance of even achieving it, I would say that it is necessary to have radical criticism of our past, our communist past, and to have a rational attitude toward it formulated from that. I maintain, in fact, that it is necessary to get out of the long-standing and still current party symbolic (spider) web, but that this cannot be done without getting out from under the shadow of all of our charismas. In your congress materials, except for several stereotypes in

connection with this, I did not see anything that would seriously indicate an awareness of this need—naturally, if you agree that it is a basic need?

[Marovic] On several occasions, I personally contributed to raising that issue in Montenegro. It is actually formalized in our documents, specifically through the issue of why Tito is or is not mentioned.

That story about some simply semantic servitude to certain symbols has a truly disturbing effect, precisely from the standpoint of the innovations that we have been talking about the whole time. The story that you have brought up also means a criticism of the implicit past. In our discussions we said that our attitude toward Tito could no longer be ritualistic, that it could not be religious, and that he could no longer be a figure that we would glorify according to the principles of evangelical dichotomy. Tito should be placed in a rational attitude; we should affirm everything that was his truly rational political contribution to our reality—a contribution that is undoubtably valid. But we must likewise be against those speakers who are active on the Yugoslav public political scene and who try to conceal their own incompetence by activating those symbols which, they think, in the existing profane religious axiology can ensure them an *a priori* alibi and guarantee them *a priori* political success.

Our attitude toward Tito, with all considerations based not only on ethnic respect but also on extreme respect for a rational political attitude, which also implies all respect for the effective results of that outstanding project—at the same time means that it is necessary for us to build our own revolutionary consistency, not by mimicking the revolutionary achievements of past generations, but on the basis of our own revolutionary contribution, if I may use that political term.

In the cognitive sense, Tito's significance in our history should be left to science. We are thus not taking a position against Tito. And why would we do that? But we have a right, in building our own future, as we are obliged to do, and in building our present as the basis of that future, to do so on the basis of our own personal and collective experience, on the basis of our own new values.

[MLADOST] Consequently, let us state: such stories are not well-intentioned stories of the new political public which would like to discredit all former people with great achievements, and forget everything that has been?

[Marovic] Those stories are, first of all, necessary because of that symbolic web which you mentioned, and then, in connection with that, they are part of our right to our own authenticity, because those people also had a right to their own authenticity, through which they also gave authenticity to this country. For the same reasons, it is only through new authenticity that we can build a better life. We cannot achieve that right of ours by retelling old stories, or by any *a priori* rejection of the significance of former stories that they may have in some text. We only want respect for the demand for the right to our own story, to our own subjective nature. The



elementary demand of every modern society is first of all mutual respect among all participants in public and political life. Everything else, including obeisance to great leaders, and charismas, means expropriation of one's own competence to participate in public affairs.

**Opening Speech at Croatian LC CC Meeting on Nationalism**

28000132 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian  
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["Text" of speech by Celestin Sardelic, member of the Presidium of the Croatian League of Communists' Central Committee [CC], at the 22 May Croatian LC CC Plenum in Zagreb: "An Imposed Unity Is Not an Authentic Unity of the Country"]

[Text] In this past period, the Croatian LC [League of Communists], without departing for even a moment from the foundations of the nationality policy of the LCY [League of Communists of Yugoslavia], has been striving to conduct a policy that would have a stabilizing effect on the situation in both Croatia and Yugoslavia. The essence of that policy was reform of the present model of socialism, shaping and pursuing a new development policy premised upon man, his interests, and his abilities. We have aimed at building a new economic and social structure that would make it possible for economic and social entities to operate more freely, so that socialism would thereby be a more economically efficient, socially just, and politically democratic society. This has been a turn toward development, toward modern world developments in science, technology, and civilized life, a turn toward shaping a new identity of Yugoslavia as a modern European and nonaligned country. That is what we see as the future of SR [Socialist Republic] Croatia and of its citizens, its nationalities, and its ethnic minorities. We felt that only on the basis of an essentially more dynamic development is it possible to achieve full equality of individuals, nationalities, and ethnic minorities in SR Croatia and its stable place in an equal Yugoslav federation. We realized that the profound social, cultural, and ethnic problems cannot be solved on the terrain of the statist model of socialism, of the stagnation and impoverishment which it has brought, as the experience of other socialist countries eloquently indicates. On the contrary, these problems are becoming ever more complicated and intractable every day. In doing this, we have tried to preserve space for optimum democratic development and political action at a time when forces of discord, nationalism, and irrationality were on the offensive and penetrated even some of the official political options. The basic thrust of this policy was to preserve relative political stability in Croatia and to facilitate the shaping and realization of reform initiatives both within the republic and also in the Federation. It is from that position that we have been reacting clearly and consistent with principle to the processes of ethnic homogenization, to the use of nationality as a political instrument in the struggle for power, to the instigation and spread of interethnic divisions and conflicts, to the

spread of nationalism and chauvinism, and to assaults on the conception of the equality of the Yugoslav nationalities and ethnic minorities, on the equal federation, and on Tito's formula for resolving the nationality question in Yugoslavia.

As far back as the Eighth Meeting of the Croatian LC Central Committee we have been warning of the danger of dogmatic and neo-Stalinist solutions, which have especially been building their strength in a tie-up with nationalism. That danger is greater today than ever. In particular, at the 23d Meeting of the Croatian LC Central Committee we made a thorough analysis of the processes and tendencies destabilizing Yugoslavia and we spelled out our fundamental positions concerning the directions of social reform and the tasks of stabilizing the political situation in the country. That policy has undoubtedly had a constructive impact in Croatia and in Yugoslavia. There is no reason, then, to change it. In spite of all the challenges and pressures, we should persist in it.

But in spite of all our efforts, the situation in Yugoslavia is continuing to worsen, and this is undoubtedly affecting the political situation and possibility of reform in Croatia. This necessitates a thorough analysis of current processes and tendencies in Yugoslavia and Croatia, definition of clear positions toward the forces and ideologies of disintegration and discord in the country, and also a cool-headed political assessment of the reach of our policy under present conditions. Corrections should be made on the basis of that kind of analysis in those segments of our policy which today are not producing the necessary results and are failing to satisfy both the rank and file and the public at large.

In that context, we must critically assess whether all of our specific political moves and reactions to certain current processes have always been prompt, definite, and convincing. After all, if the feeling spreads that our policy is vague, regardless of who is spreading it and with what intentions, we have a duty to make a critical assessment of our policy and to discover whether there are elements in it which offer basis for such political judgments. Without that kind of critical attitude, not only will we be unable to make a clear diagnosis of the situation, formulate correct responses to it, and prove the persuasiveness of our policy in public, but at the same time we will be unable to expose the manipulations and disinformation concerning our policy. It is not a question here of revising our policy, nor of giving in to those objections and pressures that come from other ideological positions, but of updating and spelling out positions on all decisive issues. For that matter, constant reassessment and change and an ongoing critical attitude toward one's own results and consequences are the essence of a democratic policy.

We have also prepared for our work analytical material which should serve exclusively as a checklist for the debate. In all opstina organizations of the Croatian LC,



conferences of the Croatian LC in communities of opstinas, and city committees of the Croatian LC there have been debates to analyze the state of interethnic relations in those communities and manifestations of nationalism and to ascertain the specific tasks of party members. You have also received a report on those debates.

### 'Historical Amnesia'

What is most disturbing today is the loss of confidence in the ability of the League of Communists and the organized socialist forces to truly carry out the agreed reform conceptions and to consolidate the socialist foundations of life in a multinational community in the new historical situation. The increasingly fierce disagreements and conflicts within the League of Communists and society over the very categorization of the nationality question and interethnic relations are particularly disturbing. This is all the more serious because all the ideological discussions and confrontations on the modalities of the social reform and transformation of the League of Communists are taking on an ethnic form. On that basis, there are growing tendencies and even explicit demands to call into question and revise certain basic principles of the policy of the CPY/LCY [Communist Party of Yugoslavia/League of Communists of Yugoslavia] toward the nationality question, the character of the federal community, achievement of national identity and emancipation of the nations on the premises of socialist self-management. The fact that Yugoslav Communists became the creators of modern Yugoslavia precisely because they conceived the socialist revolution as an inseparable unity of social and ethnic liberation is being pushed to the margin or deliberately disputed. Without that unified content, incidentally, socialism is not even possible in a multinational community.

Constructive achievements in the ethnic policy of the CPY/LCY over a lengthy historical period produced a belief that there could be no very serious or long-lasting disturbances in this area that would threaten the community. It was believed that by and large only transient interethnic disputes were possible in the country and could not jeopardize the fundamental principles of our nationality policy. If anything was regarded as an indisputable achievement of the National Liberation Struggle and socialist revolution, then it was the method and the principles for resolving the nationality question. Many among us believed that the nationality question in Yugoslavia had literally been completely "resolved"!

That conception has in a way been incorporated into LCY policy during the past decade. This has had two consequences.

First, we did not have sufficient ability to detect and react—this is now being clearly confirmed—to the disturbing signs of disruptions in interethnic and interpublic relations in the country in general. Quite often, we have been inclined to interpret them as a mere product of the socioeconomic crisis and we mechanically relate their correction to the overcoming of that crisis. This has

been a case of "historical amnesia" as to the fact that ethnic problems, once they occur and are provoked and produced by various activity, begin to develop on their own largely irrational logic and that that development can lead to tragic consequences. Kosovo today is the most obvious, but not the only, evidence of that.

Second, we have been slow to gain mature awareness of the possibility and danger of a general national crisis, which was manifested both in the disinclination and intolerance toward critical and documented debate concerning the political system in general and also concerning Yugoslav federalism. That disinclination arose out of the unqualified identification of the principles of Yugoslav federalism on the one hand and all its institutions and mechanisms on the other. That in fact is why we were unable to clearly distinguish the documented criticism of individual mechanisms and institutions, which demanded debate, from use of that criticism as an instrument to raise a political challenge to the federal system and to gain or redistribute political power. Quite often every debate of a federal institution or mechanism or some part of a complicated federal system was perceived as an attack on the federal system itself! In the context of the objective deterioration of relations in the Federation, this stimulated radical criticism of Yugoslav federalism.

That criticism of Yugoslav federalism shaped social consciousness and the behavior of various social and political protagonists in a significant way. It was the basis of diverse conceptions and practical proposals for redefining federalism and for reorganization of Yugoslavia. Federalism is not merely a technical aspect of the functioning of the state. The Yugoslav nationalities voluntarily joined and created the Yugoslav Socialist Federation. It guarantees them equality, the possibility for separate ethnic development, and democratic relations. Those principles are safeguarded and implemented through the federalism of the community, and that is why a tax on federalism in essence disputes the founding principles on which the community is based. To question federalism is to question the democratic framework for the functioning of the community. Concealed behind that is the desire for another type of socialism, a different Yugoslav political community, and another type of political democracy. That is why this problem area deserves to be one of the fundamental topics of our debate today.

### Disputed Federalism

Antifederalist tendencies are obvious in Yugoslavia's public political life today. There has been no period in the country's postwar development in which federalism has been disputed so openly and aggressively as today. Antifederalist tendencies in public political life are manifested today in four fundamental forms.

- Classic Yugoslav unitarism—which, as we know from experience, cannot win the support of a majority of the Yugoslav nationalities—has largely been replaced

by advocacy of the conception of the "unitary federation." The "unitary federation" would be based on complete economic and political desubjectivization of the republics and on limitation of their powers to cultural affairs. The republics would be reduced to geographic-cultural autonomies....

Modern political parties have actually been established on the principle of "one member—one vote." But these are political parties that operate in multiparty systems in which a citizen may choose whether he will join one, another, or a third political party. If the LCY were one of several political parties, then the propagation of this principle would take on a different meaning. So long as it is the only party and also in essence the "state" party, restructuring in conformity with that principle would lead to a change in the nature both of the LCY and also of the state-political system as a whole, and that means ethnic inequality.

The "unitary" LCY would emerge as the key protagonist in the political system. Political power and authority would be concentrated in it, and it would administer them without internal or external control. Since the advocates of this principle do not propose any other serious change except this one, we can confidently say that the purpose of their demand is to alter the character of the Federation. Appealing to "pure" class principles within the unaltered statist-distributive model of socialism in this case unambiguously serves special political interests. Finally, the LCY has never conducted a class policy at the expense of ethnic equality.

The advocates of "quiet unitarization" are to be found in some of the party and state structures. That is the real political danger of this type of antifederalism.

- The second form in which existing Yugoslav federalism is disputed is manifested in the advocacy of the conception of a "minimalist federation." It is based on denial of the ethnic identity of the individual Yugoslav nationalities and of the federal status of the republics in which they live. The essence of this conception is contained in the idea of reordering the federation according to the interests and the measure of the so-called historical nationalities: the Serbs, the Croats, and the Slovenes. In the new bipolar structure, there would be two "historical worlds": the Western and Eastern, the Northern and Southern, the Catholic and Orthodox, and so on. Some of the present federal units would enter the sphere of interest of one of those "worlds" as a subordinate part of it. The current political expression of that opinion is the persistent inclusion of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia in so-called coalitions as mere numerical appendages.

This conception is based on a reinterpretation of political relations in the old Yugoslavia. The twilight of the disintegration of that state is interpreted as a period in which its federalization actually began in conformity with the "minimal" model. Application of that model in

contemporary Yugoslavia would remove from the political stage the "invented," "imposed," "subsidized," and "maintained" nationalities and republics and would create space for "pure" relations of the traditional ethnic partners. There are ominous echoes of projects to renew the traditional "partnership" and "copartnership" in Yugoslav state relations. In the context of the immense historical burdens, all disputes and conflicts would be given that direction and would lead toward tragic antagonization and schism.

The real dangers of desubjectivization of some of the federal units—which need not be accompanied by a loss of formal status in the Federation—arise out of the immense economic and social difficulties they confront. But this is also being encouraged through the creation, constant maintenance, and renewal of affairs and scandals, which deepens the internal friction and confrontations not related to principle, and it drains off the energy necessary to resolve the essential problems.

- The third form of antifederalism is separatism. Separatist antifederalism is a consequence of anti-Yugoslavism, which exists in various forms in all ethnic communities.
- The fourth form of threat to Yugoslav federalism is nationalism. This is at the same time the most frequent and the most widespread form of antifederalism.

Communists differ from nationalists as to nationality policy in that they regard the interests of the nationalities as legitimate, but not the only and exclusive interests, and in that they oppose to national egoism and exclusiveness the sense of community, rational mediation of interests, solidarity, equality, and mutual trust and respect among the nationalities.

### National Separatism

Nationalism, then, objectively threatens the state community, including its federal system. Although Yugoslav federalism is in principle the only part of the political system which is not a matter of direct nationalist disputation—or at least not in the sense of criticism of the degree of "federalization" of the country that has been achieved—it is the part most threatened by the nationalists. That is, they are most inclined to represent it as a means of satisfying egoistic interests and goals of the nationalities and to abusing it for those purposes.

SR Croatia today, just like the entire country, is a space in which all those tendencies are manifested. Which is by no means to say that they are equally present and important in the republic's public political life. One of the ways in which the Yugoslav communities differ today is the differing presence and influence of the various antifederalist tendencies in political life. It is the task of the League of Communists to evaluate political processes and relations in all communities. Pursuing that logic, the Croatian LC has a duty to examine the situation in SR Croatia and to shape its position toward current political processes, relations, and tendencies in Croatia and Yugoslavia. This

means that it must above all take a clear position toward nationalism, both Croatian and Serbian, as the predominant form of negative political tendencies in the area of ethnic relations in Croatia.

The Croatian LC considers the debate of Croatian nationalism as the first topic of its moral and political obligation. It is not, then, an expression of "national masochism" of Communists, who systematically and groundlessly rehash the ethnic frustrations and traumas of the Croatian nationality. Nor is it an expression of a belief on our part that Croatian nationalism is today the main political problem of Yugoslavia and Croatia. The debate of Croatian nationalism is an expression of our belief that Communists always have a duty to take a position first concerning nationalism in their own nationality and community and that that gives them the right to expect the same procedure of others. Today, unfortunately, we quite frequently see altogether different patterns of behavior whereby a finger is always and exclusively pointed to "someone else's" nationalism, chauvinism, separatism, irredentism, phobism, etc. That debate, to continue, is also an expression of our belief that in its ultimate consequences nationalism is always harmful to the nationality whose betterment it calls for. It generates in other nationalities suspicion and distrust toward all initiatives, ideas, programs, and occurrences in the respective community, leads others to seek ulterior motives in everything that comes from that community, surrounds that community with unproductive suspicion, aversion, and isolation, and generates stereotypes and prejudices concerning it. That situation—without entering at this point into the extent to which it is merely a product of irrational procedures—affects all the members of a nationality, not just the nationalists; it places the entire community under a kind of ideological and political surveillance and observation.

That realization is one of the great lessons of party members and citizens of SR Croatia from 1971. The experience of the struggle against nationalism in which the consistency of Croatian Communists was demonstrated in the fight against nationalism in their own nationality, the success of the common front of Croats, Serbs, and members of other nationalities and ethnic minorities in that struggle, place an obligation on the Croatian LC to avert a possible repetition of the situation we had in 1971. Which we can do only by promptly removing the causes of Croatian nationalism, by denouncing the method of nationalistic interpretation and rationalization of objective social problems and by pointing to the consequences of its public demonstration and activity. These are the realizations and experiences which have been our point of departure in the specific and resolute struggle against occurrences of nationalism in our own community in this past period.

Croatian nationalism is manifested today in traditional and contemporary forms. Both forms have internal and external causes and stimuli. It is not always easy to find the line of demarcation, since the elements of the two often are mixed and interwoven.

Traditional Croatian nationalism is reproduced on well-known ideological and political premises. The essence of the national is defined primarily in its historical dimension. Reference is made to the "undiluted historical legacy" of the Croatian people and ethnic consciousness is derived from its conception of the "constructive traditions" of Croatian history. The demand that Croatia organize itself as an exclusive national state of Croats on the principle of "untruncated" national sovereignty becomes the backbone of its political program. And national sovereignty in SR Croatia is "truncated," according to that conception, by the constitutional position of the Serbs in Croatia. History and current processes in Croatia and Yugoslavia are interpreted from that point of view. An attempt is being made on that program to make inroads in the public and indeed even to organize politically, as in the case of the attempt to establish the Croatian Democratic Community. What is more, attitudes like these have been evident in several articles in the debate about constitutional amendments in SR Croatia concerning the question of the constitutional definition of the republic and the name of the language.

#### Croatian Nationalism

Attempts at political revaluation of the "mass movement" in 1971, which is interpreted as a basically democratic movement accompanied only by certain negative processes and excesses, are today typical of that political platform....

The renewal of traditional Croatian nationalism is particularly favored by the unitary antifederalist tendencies and the open public representation of other nationalisms, especially Serbian nationalism. Not only does this stimulate nationalistic tendencies, it also arouses a sense of unrest and fear in citizens of SR Croatia and objectively broadens the room for Croatian nationalism and an anti-Serb disposition.

The Croatian LC judges that never in postwar development has the anti-Croat dimension of Serbian nationalism in Yugoslavia been exhibited so openly and destructively. Hundreds of articles have been published in which the thesis of the genocidal nature, anti-Serbism, and anti-Yugoslavism of Croats is systematically advanced. It is said that "weak forces" in Croatia have been fighting against hatred of the Serbs, and even when they have done so, they have used a "strategy of forgetting" and "symmetry." Serbophobia has allegedly been supported even "officially" in Croatia, and that continuity is seen in "four periods of the past—1914, 1941, 1972, and 1988." Opinions concerning the position of the Serbs in SR Croatia are extensively quoted as evidence of the thesis of Serbophobia and genocidism. It is said that heirs of the ideas of Rauch, Frank, and Pavelic are "today applying the method of silent, imperceptible, and concealed, but well-calculated, assimilation" and that the national chauvinist policy in Croatia today is merely a continuation of the anti-Serb and anti-Yugoslav policy of the past. It is explicitly said that the roots of

Serbophobia are in the "communist movement of Yugoslavia," and that the Comintern created "its headquarters in Ljubljana and Zagreb, wherefrom the two strictly national Communist Parties emitted 'internationalist ideas' in the direction of the eastern part of the country." It is said that in Yugoslavia today there are "two centers from which the attack is launched on everything that is Serb: one is Pristina, while the other is located in the so-called Central European part of Yugoslavia." Certainly, the politically most insolent thesis is that the "Albanian national revindications in Kosovo are a pledge of the present ethnic and governmental status of Slovenia and Croatia" and that support for "Albanian revindications" is "outright treasonous activity...."

Present-day Croatian nationalism is of more recent origin and is configured on different ideological and political premises than traditional nationalism. It is a direct product of the economic, political, and cultural development in the last several years, and so the essence of the ethnic is defined primarily in a contemporary dimension.

Its basic premise is that contemporary political processes in the "eastern" part of the country are threatening the possibility and prospects of Croatia's modern and democratic development. Pledges for that kind of development are therefore seen in institutional protection against inroads of totalitarian tendencies and movements from the "East" into Croatia, which actually means a weakening of the governmental ties among the Yugoslav nationalities. Contemporary Croatian nationalism is not as a rule anti-Yugoslav in its premises, but in its objective consequences it is.

In the logic of contemporary Croatian nationalism, SR Croatia is not only or primarily a space for traditional (language, culture, and history) national identification, but primarily a field for achievement of modern economic development, political democracy, and cultural and civilized integration in Europe. Yugoslavia is called into question not because of an a priori opposition to Yugoslavia, but because of the current political option of a closed, backward, and undemocratic society. The exclusive orientation toward the republic as the space for modern development and democracy generates a desire for ever greater exclusiveness toward others in Yugoslavia. Modern economic development, political democracy, and cultural and civilized integration in Europe and the world are also the indisputable programmatic goals of the Croatian LC, but it wants to bring them about both as a Croatian and also as a Yugoslav option.

Contemporary Croatian nationalism, however, is itself based on a "positive prejudice" about Croatia as a space which is historically and currently free of the existence and danger of the birth of undemocratic options and movements. It turns certain contemporary political experiences into new stereotypes and revives old stereotypes about particular nationalities and communities—this especially applies to the Serbian nationality and Serbian policy in Yugoslavia, which is conceived as

continuous unitarist, hegemonist, and Stalinist activity—building long-range political projects on them. In spite of those unfounded aspects, this pattern of political thinking could gain quite considerable support in SR Croatia, especially if certain political processes and stirrings continue. The Croatian LC will be able to effectively oppose contemporary Croatian nationalism only if it takes a clear position toward those phenomena and commits itself to the conception of socialism as an open, progressive, and democratic society. But in Yugoslavia today that means embarking on an open political debate and struggle against the protagonists of neo-Stalinism and totalitarianism. At this point, the interdependence of Yugoslav federalism and the Yugoslav government community in general, on the one hand, and political democracy on the other becomes obvious.

### Serbian Nationalism

Serbian nationalism in Croatia, although it has certain specific constants, is shaped above all as a reflex of Serbian nationalism in Yugoslavia and as a response to Croatian nationalism.

Serbian nationalism in Yugoslavia is directed toward political mobilization of Serbs in all federal units in order to achieve its general political objectives. The basic origin and generator of the shaping and spreading of Serbian nationalism is the prolonged crisis of interethnic relations in Kosovo, the aggressive action of Albanian nationalism against Serbs and Montenegrins, and the problems of the constitutional status of SR Serbia. Quite recently, it has been particularly turned toward Serbs in Croatia. The backbone of its approach is the thesis of total assimilation, of being threatened, of the ethnic and civil oppression of Serbs in SR Croatia. They are seen as a part of the overall "anti-Serb" policy in Yugoslavia, of which the suffering of the Serbian nationality in Kosovo is the universal pattern. The "guardianship" over the Serbs in Croatia is based on the tacit, but also overt assumption that this is an inferior segment of the Serbian nationality which is incapable of articulating its own social, political, and cultural interests and requirements. It is therefore being demanded that they be an exclusive part of pan-Serb policy in Yugoslavia, which would be shaped in the "motherland." All past and present political leadership, institutions, and organizations of SR Croatia are referred to as the creators and abettors of "anti-Serb policy" in Yugoslavia. It is in that name that the Serbs in Croatia are being called upon to offer resistance to the policy of the Croatian LC.

The consequences of such action are unforeseeable, and they must be reflected on by those who wholeheartedly advocate them in the name of the "good" of the Serbian nationality in Croatia. First of all, that would result in an ethnic confrontation in Croatia. The rallying of the Serbian nationality in Yugoslavia, in Croatia particularly, would necessarily result in ethnic homogenization and a rallying of the Croats, as well as activation of Croatian nationalism, which has always been directed first against the Serbs in Croatia. Croatian nationalism

has already been on a constant search for evidence of "treason," of a Fifth Column, of a "Belgrade branch," and the like among the Serbs in Croatia. It interprets every expression of Serbian nationalism as an "internal" threat to Croatia.

Any exclusive ethnic policy in a multinational community always places the protagonists of that policy in a confrontation with all the others. But all people on both sides become the victims of the confrontation. Yet the consequences are worst for the members of those ethnic communities who are objectively in a minority position in any federal unit. Just as Croatian nationalism, for instance, leads to isolation, suspicion, and abhorrence of everything preceded by that ethnic sign in Yugoslavia in general, so Serbian nationalism leads to creation of suspicion toward everything preceded by the Serbian ethnic sign in Croatia. In both cases, all Croats and all Serbs are hurt in some way.

The policy of the LCY and the Croatian LC as a whole are certainly hurt as well, and that is why Communists must always eliminate the causes of disagreements, disputes, and possible conflicts....

Neither is AVNOJ [Anti-Fascist Council of People's Liberation of Yugoslavia] Yugoslavia a solution for a certain type of clericalism. Catholic nationalists of the traditional type are separatistically oriented. According to them, the solution of the Croatian nationality question is possible only in a separate Croatian state, which is why their political program is always bound up with the Stepinac cult. The Orthodox nationalists, on the other hand, see the resolution of the Serbian nationality question only in a Serbian national state that would bring together all Serbs, or, on the other hand, in a Yugoslavia which would essentially be an expanded Serbia.

Both the Catholic and the Orthodox nationalisms have gone through significant modification in their present forms. For the former, the Croatian nationality question can be solved in Yugoslavia if it respects the principle of untruncated national sovereignty and offers Croats an occasion to mainly organize their life according to the principles of Catholic morality. This type of clericalism would like to present itself as democratic and culturally superior to Orthodoxy and integrative when it comes to Croats. Because of the "present threat to the Croatian nationality" the broadest ethnic alliance is possible, one that would include even a segment of the "ethnically aware" members of the party.

It is manifested today primarily through the thesis of the political and cultural threat to the Croatian nationality, especially to its language, and this becomes a rallying point for Catholic nationalists.

Current Orthodox nationalism basically has three characteristics. It is manifested today as a segment of the Serbian nationalist movement. It directly or covertly calls into question the Montenegrin and Macedonian nations and accuses the LC of producing new nations

and churches. The current stimulus of the national-religious rallying is the situation in Kosovo. In Croatia, it is described as an effort to set itself apart and represent itself as the sole guardian of the Serbian nationality and its culture. It feels that the Serbian nationality question in Croatia could be resolved within the limits of existing boundaries, but with recognition of exclusive autonomy under the essential influence of Orthodoxy in culture and in politics. All the forms of the tie-up between clericalism and nationalism are markedly antiecumenical.

#### A Common Homeland

The policy of the Croatian LC is based on the premise that SR Croatia is the common homeland and state of the Croatian and Serbian nationalities in it and also of those segments of other nationalities and ethnic minorities that live in it. It is this as a part of the SFRY which is the common homeland and state of all the Yugoslav nationalities and ethnic minorities.

Although the term "homeland" is not a constitutional category, in contemporary Croatian and Yugoslav society it is not superfluous to reaffirm the experience of community in this region down through history, which has been represented by that term. The community of the Croats and Serbs in Croatia, regardless of all the disruptions there have been in development, is established as a stable historical fact which is based on the historical consciousness of a community of fundamental interests as a people over a lengthy historical period.

The Croatian nationality realizes its national statehood in SR Croatia as its national state. But segments of the Croatian nationality living in the other socialist republics realize their statehood in them. So, nowhere outside the boundaries of SR Croatia, but within the boundaries of the SFRY can the Croatian nationality be an ethnic minority which would be no one's concern except that of its national state, its parent homeland, SR Croatia. This cannot be changed by any sort of pressures, nor by changes in the balance of power, since it is an integral part of the institution of the equal federation and of the equality of the nationalities and ethnic minorities. In that sense, Yugoslavia is a factor contributing to the unity of the Croatian people. The same principle also applies to the other nationalities in Yugoslavia. Thus, the Serbian nationality in SR Croatia is a constituent segment of the statehood of our republic. When the Croats and Serbs in Croatia are in question, it should be borne in mind that the shaping of statehood in this way is not confined to the communist tradition. The Illyrian movement, for example, is a decisive phase not only of Croatian, but also of Serbian national integration in the Croatian regions. A great number of other experiences in the history of the Croats and Serbs in Croatia in the 19th and 20th centuries are equally stimulating in that sense.

Croato-Serbian historical community, the equality of the Croats and Serbs in SR Croatia, and brotherhood and unity were reinforced in the National Liberation Struggle and socialist revolution, as has been expressed in the

fundamental principles of ZAVNOH [Anti-Fascist Council of People's Liberation of Croatia] Croatia, whose legitimate successor is SR Croatia. But all of this can be conceived and maintained only on the assumptions of an AVNOJ Yugoslav community and system....

The nature of ethnic relations in Croatia as a whole depends greatly on what they are regionally and locally. The immense financial resources which have been invested up to now in the underdeveloped regions and opstinas of the republic have not yielded the expected results. This is surely the result of the overall economic policy in the country, but also of particular developmental and economic failures within the republic. The statist-distributive conception of the development of the republic has proven to be altogether inefficient, especially when it comes to the development of underdeveloped regions. That is why in the framework of the new conception of development, whose points of departure are the market and economic efficiency, we have undertaken to redefine the strategy for development of the underdeveloped so that their more rapid development would be achieved on the basis of the criteria acknowledged by the market. Economic development is one of the essential pillars for achieving ethnic equality.

As for the development of the underdeveloped in Croatia, close attention ought not to be restricted solely to the economic area. The underdeveloped regions of the republic are regularly more underdeveloped from the cultural standpoint than from the economic standpoint. Since culture is a factor in general social development, investments in it are not a luxury, especially if we bear in mind that numerous subtle questions of ethnic identification are expressed primarily in the field of culture. In a majority of the underdeveloped opstinas, appropriations for culture are constantly below the republic average. Except when the cultural legacy is bound up with the National Liberation Struggle, it is approached as a rule with reserve and suspicion. Thus, the sense has been created among both the Croats and the Serbs in those regions that traditional values of the ethnic legacy have been displaced and questioned. All of this demands a considerably more subtle and complex approach to the problem of the ethnic and cultural identity of all the nationalities in SR Croatia. We have need for an entire series of up-to-date cultural initiatives so that the identity of both the Serbian and Croatian nationalities in Croatia develops and expresses itself freely. Throughout its history, Croatian culture has been open to creative individuals of non-Croat origin and allegiance. In it, there has been a particularly significant contribution by creative people of Serbian origin and allegiance, which is one of the permanent inspirations for the community of Croats and Serbs in Croatia. The policy of ethnic equality presupposes the kind of community that will not question the right of any creative individual to freely integrate into any national culture at his own choice, to integrate into two or more cultures, or in ethnic terms not to integrate at all in cultural creativity. Freedom of creativity must in this sense be inviolable, since the

exercise of human rights and liberties is the most reliable criterion for evaluating any nationality policy.

We must be extremely critical and objective in analyzing the activity of all cultural institutions and guarantee that they show equal concern for the expression of the Croatian and Serbian and all the other national identities in SR Croatia. Unless this is done, there will, of course, be a growing demand for separate ethnic institutions. Instituting the committee of the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts to coordinate research into the history and culture of the Serbian nationality in Croatia is a visible if not a sufficient step forward. There are projects under way in SR Croatia to revitalize the modern cultural function of "Prosvjete," to renovate sacred monuments and other cultural monuments, there is an initiative for a new magazine, and thought is being given to a number of important new initiatives that would promote the research and development of the culture of the Serbian nationality in Croatia.

In that sense, we hope that the provision concerning the use of languages in SR Croatia, which has been put up to broad public debate, will satisfy the demands that the unity of a language spoken in four republics be respected, that an opportunity will open up for every nationality to call that language by its own name, and that the separateness of the version of the common language which is mostly spoken in SR Croatia will be expressed. Those demands are in keeping with the proclaimed views of the Presidium of the Croatian LC Central Committee, which have emphasized both the fact of there being one language and also the fact of there being distinct versions of it. It should also be noted that the constitutional provision concerning the use of languages by the nature of things cannot in and of itself guarantee everything necessary for implementing the corresponding policy of equality of languages (from the free and equal use of scripts in the school system to the right to authorial expression and full tolerance in public), in all its segments from legal and sublegal acts all the way to completely practical applications in culture and education, everything necessary for enforcement in keeping with the principles of the full equality of languages and versions, in linguistic tolerance and facilitation of authentic community in building a Yugoslav culture conceived as a project of unity in diversity....

We have already been encountering cases in elections to bodies of self-management in collectives in certain ethnically mixed communities where grouping takes place on an ethnic basis and candidates are not elected solely because they belong to a particular nationality (either Serbs or Croats or certain other nationalities).

These phenomena are for the present sporadic, but they call attention to the possibility of a dangerous political trend. "Elections" in which candidates are elected or not elected solely because they are of a particular nationality utterly contradict the premises of any democracy and directly threaten the policy of ethnic equality.

Our fight against these phenomena can be successful only if in the entire LCY and SFRY we turn toward a reform course and toward a change in political conditions in the country. If we affirm democracy and a democratic political culture to the measure of man. Likewise, the struggle against our own nationalism and ethnic homogenization can be successful only if everyone in Yugoslavia does this on the basis of uniform criteria.

There are four basic directions for the activity of the Croatian LC in the strategy of social reform, directions which have decisive importance to the development of stable interethnic relations, to the political stability of Croatia and Yugoslavia, and to the development and affirmation of individual, social, and ethnic freedoms, to the equality and affirmation of all nationalities and ethnic minorities: 1) the market economy; 2) a state based on law; 3) an equal federation; and 4) pluralistic democracy.

1. We advocate modern development on the foundations of a market economy as a segment of the world market, which guarantees unhampered business initiative of individuals and collectives throughout the entire space of Yugoslavia, economic integration of Yugoslavia, and its relationship with Europe and the world. A precondition for that is the independence of both individual and collective economic entities, their freedom to choose the manner of economic existence whereby they best realize their interests and needs. Only on that basis is it possible to economically motivate producers and achieve efficiency of the entire economy. Market competition based on economic freedom of the individual and legal guarantees of the equality of the various forms of ownership are the most effective means known to date to stimulate the initiative and creativity of producers and economic progress.

Economic freedom and independence of economic entities are a condition for the strengthening of the economic and social content of self-management. The struggle for economic affirmation on the market, for development and higher pay necessarily awaken the potential for innovation and work in every individual and every collective. And the bodies of self-management are exceptionally suitable for channeling that potential into the common interests and joint decisions.

2. We favor construction of a modern and efficient state based on law with a legal framework to protect the unhampered development of market processes and development, to prevent monopolies and guarantee equal access to social resources, more effective protection of human rights and freedoms, legal security and social equality of the members of the community. The transition to the market as the basic mechanism for economic regulation also requires that the powers and functions of the state be limited to establishment and protection of the general conditions of social reproduction as well as to necessary interventions in economic life in order to correct the adverse consequences of the operation of the market system and to protect society from monopolies, the elements, and social injustice. In that case, the government is not a direct manager of the

economy and society. The essence of its position is that the general interests of society are guaranteed and the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens are protected through democratic enactment of laws and through their effective and fair enforcement toward all entities in society. The law and legislation are then the fundamental regulators of relations among citizens as well as between citizens and the government, and the assemblies are the institutionalized focus of the political life of the community, of rational debate, and of creation of the general interest that takes the form of a law. This presupposes respect for the principle that everything is permitted that has not been explicitly prohibited by law and that the only limit on pursuit of one's own interest is respect for the equal rights of others as guaranteed by law. Establishment of a state based on law is a condition for renewal of civilized life and for relieving interethnic and other tensions and conflicts. Guaranteeing the protection of individual and ethnic rights and freedoms of citizens guarantees their full equality and equal rights. Full ethnic equality and national identity are expressed at the level of every citizen as his right, while at the level of the state they are expressed as an obligation to guarantee and protect that right.

#### Pluralistic Democracy

3. We are in favor of an equal federation as a socialist community of freely associated and equal nationalities and ethnic minorities and of republics and provinces. The federal principle is the foundation of relations and of life together in the SFRY. To call that principle into question is to call into question the equality of the nationalities and ethnic minorities and the survival of Yugoslavia.

The struggle for a socialist and federal Yugoslavia, and it is only that kind of Yugoslavia that could survive, means defending the fundamental principle of the 1974 Constitution whereby the working people, nationalities, and ethnic minorities exercise their sovereign rights in republics, while in the Federation they exercise those rights which are in the common interest of all. This presupposes independence in regulating relations within the republics and equality in relations at the level of the Federation. When it comes to the vital interests of the nationalities and the republics, interests that affect their national sovereignty and equality, there can be no majority rule. Here, the consensus of all the federal units is mandatory and irreplaceable.

Federalism is not merely a condition for maintaining our multinational community, it is also a productive factor in the strategy of its social development. That is, independence and reliance on our own resources in socioeconomic, scientific, and technological development cannot be reduced to the level of the government or sociopolitical community. Its significance is much broader and presupposes responsibility of every political, economic, and self-management entity for the steps taken in development in their own respective communities so that they serve the general development of the Yugoslav community. That



kind of development strategy leads all of us and each of us to confront our own economic, scientific, and technical capabilities, our own capabilities of programming and carrying out the development of our own respective communities. In that regard, development of the part cannot be contrary to the development of the whole nor detrimental to the whole. By the same token, we cannot neglect our own development in order to develop the whole. It is only within that framework that responsibility can be built up for development of the parts and coresponsibility for development of the entire community....

4. We favor pluralistic democracy, which is based on the sovereignty of the individual citizen, on the inalienability of his political rights and freedoms, on the freedom of political activity and association, on direct and secret elections with multiple candidates and programs, on equality and respect for diversity of interests and views, and on legal and political guarantees of security and the rights of individuals and minorities.

Political pluralism is surely a term subject to the greatest political disputes in the League of Communists today and indeed throughout society. The attitude toward it is expressed in three views: an unambiguous and fierce antipluralism, which culminates in utterly absurd statements that even dictatorship is better than political pluralism; in the fundamental and largely unprofiled propluralistic view that occurs mainly when confronted with real forms of political pluralism in various communities; and in an unfamiliarity with the problem and noncommittal attitude toward it, which will not be able to last long. Certainly, it is not just a question of formal declaration for or against something, but of profiling a more complete position....

Political pluralism must be an integral part of the upcoming reform of the political system. It cannot consist of marginal corrections of existing institutions and organizations, but must involve a more thorough change of the political system.

The reform of the political system so conceived has profound justification in contemporary political events in Yugoslavia. The political crisis in the country has confirmed that the existing institutions of the political system have been impervious to new ideas and programs, to affirmation of the political will of the citizens. The imperviousness, inflexibility, and static nature of those institutions have stimulated forms of political activity outside institutions: mass demonstrations, political strikes, and protests. To a large extent, they have represented an undemocratic assault on all the institutions of the political system, an assault that inherently presents a danger of undemocratic "final solutions."

Large-scale assaults on institutions have in history ended either in states of emergency and dictatorships or in disintegration of government communities. In the face of that prospect, thought must necessarily be given to the nature of the political system and political relations

being opened up. After all, the prospects did not open up independently of those relations!

Political pluralism would create legally guaranteed institutional opportunities for people to express their ideas, initiatives, and programs and to fight for them within the framework of the political system.

This is not a time for extensive debate about political pluralism: about its organizational forms, about its place in the political system, about obligations and rights, and so on. The League of Communists is not the only one that should make the decision on that. But still there is a need to point out certain quandaries that have accompanied this phenomenon.

First of all, all forms of political pluralism are acceptable only if the constitutional foundations of the political system are respected. Second, forms of political organization which are programmatically or practically based on ethnic, religious, political, or other intolerance and discrimination are not acceptable.

Third, political pluralism is a means—contrary to what is frequently thought and said—for dehomogenization rather than for homogenization of ethnic communities. Within an ethnic community, individuals rally around various political ideas, initiatives, and programs, and they do not close ranks around the only national programs being formulated by a single political protagonist. Political pluralism is a means of political segmentation rather than ethnic homogenization. That is why it figures to be a real obstacle to the birth of all-inclusive ethnic programs and mass ethnic movements.

We will fight for political life in SR Croatia and the SFRY to develop in keeping with these principles. The principles we favor in resolving the nationality question are inseparable. They must be applied completely, equally, and in their entirety in all communities in Yugoslavia. Democratic relations and processes must be the property of all and must be valid for all. We are aware that this demands a change both in the inherited political culture and also in institutional arrangements. We feel that there is a need for the greatest urgency in undertaking to draft a program for democratic reform of the political system in the republic and to make preparations for working out the ideological and political foundations for a new SFRY Constitution.

This presentation constitutes a political position prefatory to the discussion and a contribution to analysis of the key commitments of the LCY concerning the nationality question and their suitability to present practice. It is an attempt to define more precisely our position toward the essence of the constitutional and federal system of the SFRY, toward various attempts to dispute our federal system, toward the urgent issues of unity and community in SR Croatia and the SFRY, and also to spell out our constructive political platform and reform initiative in establishing stable interethnic relations, the equality of the nationalities and ethnic minorities and the development of socialist democracy. As we said at



the beginning, this presentation attempts to furnish elements of answers to the questions put in the introduction, and that is what today's debate must aim for.

### **Nationalism Seen Threatening Interethnic Relations in Croatia**

28000141 Zagreb VJESNIK (PANORAMA SUBOTOM Supplement) in Serbo-Croatian 10 Jun 89 p 7

[Article by Milan Jajcinovic: "The Spreading of the Kosovo Morass"]

[Text] Following the revolution in 1848, Marx proclaimed the Croats and Serbs across the Danube to be unrevolutionary or counterrevolutionary peoples. Franz Mehring then recorded that Marx believed that there could not be a unification of the South Slavs, since supposedly the "Austrian" and "Turkish" Slavs "had for centuries known one another as thieves and bandits," and that in spite of their Slavic kinship they hated one another more than the Slavs and the Hungarians.

The gentlemen from the banovina seats, who after the "malmsey had flowed" (led by the "little dentist with the goldfish in his head") set off to pay their respects to the regent; the gentlemen around the regent and Mister Baje undoubtedly did not even know, much less did they care, what "some son of "Moses" had said. Even if they knew, they were convinced that the triumph of the "Dinaric race"—creation of the state of the "people with three names"—was the clearest denial of the talk of the man who wrote about the "specter of communism." The creators of the FNRJ [Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia], however, realized (if in fact they ever believed that it was not a question of "imperialist propaganda") that the mention of "mutuality" that came down to "thieves" and "bandits" was a refutation of their guru, who had been refuted anyway by the revolution and by operationalization of the slogan of brotherhood and unity. Afterward, as the years passed, the optimism spread that application of the so-called Leninist principle (which holds that the "right to self-determination all the way to cessation" had been consumed once and forever by creation of the state!) had completely solved the nationality question. Reality has very rudely demonstrated otherwise. The denial came first with the emergence of the Croatian "mass movement," then with the Albanian eruption in Kosovo, and then with the later geysers of Serbian revanchism.

In a time when the political restrictions were loosening up, the party's monopoly of the truth also began to crumble. The explosion of the ethnic aspect, that is, the spread of its malformation, the nationalistic aspect, as a part of the universal crisis, undermined still more the legitimacy of the LCY as the sole (self-)acknowledged possessor of the formula for resolving interethnic problems. As interethnic relations deteriorated, various political alchemistries—outside the party and within it—offering their concepts, became more numerous, persistent, and aggressive. In the retorts of their laboratories, the political alchemists are today stirring various mixes that will

arrange both Yugoslavia and the future. And they say that they possess the formula for a panacea that will eliminate all Yugoslavia's problems. For the present, the panacea that is the biggest seller is that of the group of members of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts known by its "popular" name: the Memorandum, which is systematically and persistently being offered to the entire country.

### **The Truth Painted Over**

So that the solution offered by the memorandum might be imposed on the entire country, the bulldozers of the propaganda machine first cleared the media so that the multitude could be brainwashed without hindrance. The truth was painted over with ethnic paint. Certain old ethnic stereotypes were brought up-to-date, and certain new ones were created. The Albanians were divided into the "dishonorable" majority and the "honorable" minority (the only familiar names in the latter are Ali Shukrija, Halit Trnavci, Rahman Morina, and Husamedin Azemi). The latter, it is said, have a Yugoslav orientation, while the former are disguised irredentists inclined to "Asiatic reproduction" with a political objective. In this made-to-order and stereotyped reality, the Slovenes are incurable separatists, ingrates more inclined to Europe than to their "southern brothers." The Croats are then reduced to crafty Serbophobes inclined to genetic genocide. Which is probably why Stevo Zigon is today the only "true Slovene." Among the Croats there is no such "real one" among any of the living. Only the late Viktor Novak qualifies.

In order to "prove" the historical continuity of Croatian anti-Serb activity, the story is constantly repeated about the alleged axis made up of Tito, Krajacic, Hebrang, Bakaric, and then later Vrhovec. At the end, the first was "after all only a Croat" (which seems to be all it takes to be against the Serbs!), the second was "his most reliable collaborator" and promoter of the "strategy of forgetting" (it is said that he sent "five suitcases of material about the genocide" abroad for that reason), the third, they say, wanted to establish the Croatian Communist Party in the Independent State of Croatia, the fourth joined Kardelj and Tito in "working to pull Serbia to pieces," while the fifth said that "the old Yugoslavia should not even have been defended." The Serbs in Croatia are told that they are threatened by assimilation, that they have it "worse than in Kosovo," that what is going on in Croatia is "erasure of everything Serb." It is also said that the Serbs in SR Croatia are unable to articulate their own political, economic, social, and cultural interests. Which justifies the attempt of political tutelage over them, while at the same time the Serbian politicians in Croatia (Dragosavac, Baltic, Ugrcic, Stojcevic...) are called wishy-washy, careerists, or traitors to the nationality. Which is why emissaries are being sent among the Serbian population and are urging political disobedience.

In certain communities in Croatia, there is felt a "certain ethnic cooling," or a trend toward ethnic separation is noted (there have been cases when people were not

elected to management bodies solely because they were Serbs or Croats. Ethnic polarizations are giving rise to debates over language, the story is spreading about the "inequality and assimilation of the Serbs in Croatia," and there is a spread of political pluralism, which some people think to be only a disguise for return of the "mass movement people" to the political scene. But the greatest distance between the Croats and Serbs is still created by the perception of official Serbian policy. If we might generalize, then it can be said that just as it encounters affinity and approval with Serbs, so does it arouse equal (and indeed considerably greater) abhorrence and ill temper in Croats. There are even assertions that were not uttered by "the men in the street" that there are even members of the Croatian LC who pay more respect to the policy of the "Milosevic phenomenon" than to the positions of the Croatian LC (which, of course, is not Milosevic's problem), which could always be a suitable occasion for Croatian nationalists to call for a "recollection of history" and to begin to grumble more loudly about a Fifth Column. Fortunately, the researchers into interethnic relations say that so far between 10 and 15 percent of the population has been infected with the nationalistic virus in SR Croatia.

#### Concentric Circles

Prof Zvonko Lerotic was right when he said that relations between ethnic entities in Croatia are better preserved than in other parts of the country. Those relations are not, of course, idyllic, but they are far more sound than those in Serbia, that is, in Kosovo—where the several years of mounting intolerance has reached the point of sublimation. But the concentric circles of the Kosovo morass, disturbed 8 years ago, have spread even outside Kosovo. Serbian nationalism has risen up out of the silt and muck of the Kosovo swamp like some mythical monster. It swam out full of anger at everything that has happened in Kosovo to the "Serbian martyrs and exiles," demanding that Serbia be "a state like the others" (all the republics except Bosnia-Herzegovina were established on the principle of ethnic identity; Serbia's right to that was denied); that is, the Constitution was amended (not long ago Mojmir Ocvirk, member of the Presidium of the Slovenian Socialist Youth League, said: "As for the objections from Serbia, I would say that the 1974 Constitution would never have come about if Serbia had not counted on having two votes more." But the anger (justified) soon experienced a partial transformation into "defensive nationalism" (which is the one) "when people defend themselves and strive for their emancipation," as Ljubomir Tadic, member of the academy, has put it). Still more rapidly it left behind that defensive bullet-proof vest and put on the vestments which are a perfect fit and were cut from the Memorandum by the tireless and diligent tailors who make "spiritual suits," becoming, along with Albanian nationalism, the most furious nationalism in the country.

Serbian nationalism is disturbing. In Croatia, perhaps even more than elsewhere. There are probably at least three reasons for that: historical experience with nationalism, the strength of the Serbian nationalistic wave, and

attempts to manipulate a segment of the Serbian diaspora in Croatia. At the last meeting of the Croatian LC Central Committee, when interethnic relations were on the agenda—Celestin Sardelic said (and none of the members of the Central Committee contradicted him) that "never in postwar development had the anti-Croatian dimension of Serbian nationalism in Yugoslavia been displayed so openly and destructively." A bit earlier, Dr Enver Sehovic spoke in the LCY Central Committee about "reflexes of infuriated Serbian nationalism," which is manifested "through a modernized derivative of the bourgeois Pasic perception of Serbia and its Yugoslavia" and through the activity of those who in principle advocate a market economy and opening up to the world, while actually they are in favor of a siphoning of income. And for that purpose they have to increase the power of the state and also take it over through the "classical hierarchically organized Communist Party," based on the principle of one member—one vote!

Sehovic said in that meeting that such a policy can be seen through the "Milosevic phenomenon." In an interview with NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA, some 10 days later Dr Tomislav Jantol was still more detailed. He said: "My impression is this: the policy of Slobodan Milosevic is awakening Croatian nationalism even in people with no nationalistic bias whatsoever and that the rougher that policy is in its methods, the more it will grow. Milosevic and his group will not be perceived as protagonists of an undemocratic policy, but as Serbs, and there will be an increasing sense of being threatened by Serbian nationalism. This is a very dangerous trend. That is why the policy of Slobodan Milosevic should be vigorously opposed even on behalf of the future of interethnic relations. That is why I say: the battle against Croatian nationalism should be fought at this point in Belgrade, not in Zagreb, although I do not underestimate the activity of nationalist groups in Croatia either."

#### Old Stereotypes

Even today, traditional Croatian nationalism is nurturing its old arguments about the "plundering of Croatia" and its disenfranchisement within Yugoslavia. Some have been additionally updated by events in recent years. First of all, those to the effect that "Serbian supremacy" exists in the SFRY and "Serbian infiltration" in SR Croatia. Traditional Croatian nationalism has experienced a mutation and is now manifested as a negator of Yugoslavia. But it disputes the Yugoslavia that people would like to establish through the lever of an "antibureaucratic revolution" and feeds on stereotypes like the one about "Croatian cultural superiority" and "Serbian backwardness and barbarism." Should the threats of "export of revolution" continue, modernized Croatian nationalism will only achieve a confirmation of the justifiability of its own fear. Should the top political leadership in Croatia continue to waver and hesitate, shilly-shally, and refrain from saying what it thinks about the problems flooding the country like a torrent and about the "saviors" who are offering a refuge

on ethnic gunboats, Croatian nationalism could become a kind of "national rescue committee," which also offers dry land.

Dr Srzan Vrcan, professor, certainly had the potential role of Croatian nationalism as a "savior" when he spoke about what is called the Croatian silence in a recent meeting of the Commission of the Croatian LC Central Committee for Ideological and Theoretical Work. He did not agree with the assertions (which were heard even on that occasion) that silence was actually a metaphor for reasonableness. It makes sense only to a certain point, and after that it becomes counterproductive, Professor Vrcan believes. Which is probably why he did not refrain from saying: "Those who calmly watched the indictment of Vllasi being written can expect to have one written out for them before long!" It is obvious that Professor Vrcan does not equate silence with reasonableness nor does he share the opinion that it would be reasonable and sensible to be silent, since "the logic that one does not feed unacceptable tendencies if one refuses to oppose them may be a good one, but in a situation when those tendencies are all ablaze, it is unproductive." In his view, "silence cannot have a constructive political effect," since "the fundamental principles of the Yugoslav community must begin to be spoken of openly." What is more, Professor Vrcan also put the question of what the Croatian silence has achieved in practical terms, has it contributed to "improvement of interethnic relations in Croatia or Yugoslavia?" The answer can only be in the negative. After all, if interethnic relations in Croatia are not greatly more polluted than before, they certainly are in Yugoslavia.

The ethnic relations between Croats and Serbs in Croatia are no pastoral scene. But they certainly are not as black as some would like to represent them. Actually, they are far more harmonious than the Yugoslav average, although they do share the destiny of the struggle between differing political conceptions of whose outcome will be crucial to the future design of Yugoslavia. In that Yugoslav political gymnasium, disciplines in the uniforms of the unitary federation that would swallow up the republics and reduce them to regional-cultural autonomies and would also unitarize the LCY (under the slogan that the interests of the workers is everywhere the same) are now fighting for dominance. The other team is made up of advocates of a minimalist federation whose objective is to "put things back in their place," i.e., to rearrange the country to suit the interests of the "historical nationalities" (similar to the Cvetkovic-Macek agreement; only differently). The third team is made up of separatists of various kinds, for whom Yugoslavia represents "evil destiny" which should be fled from as soon as possible. The nationalists, also belonging to various kinds, are the fourth group of participants, and they are not interested in a federal arrangement of Yugoslavia. At present, these are the most belligerent. They might even bring about Yugoslavia's collapse with their fighting with one another. After all, the Croato-Serbian relation is Yugoslavia's pivot. When it is shaken,

all Yugoslavia is shaken. Thus, the Kosovization of Yugoslavia threatens a Serbo-Croatian nationalistic conflict that will at the same time be a tragic proof that when Marx spoke about the South Slavs he was right at least about one thing: that some still "perceive each other as thieves and bandits."

**Arrest, Torture of Vllasi's Relatives Recounted**  
*28000136a Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian*  
*30 May 89 pp 10-11*

[Article by Jasna Babic: "Confession of a Hidden Prisoner"]

[Text] Agim Vllasi, 31-year-old chauffeur for the Center for Social Welfare in Kosovska Kamenica Opstina, was released from "isolation" on 15 May of this year—immediately after Josip Vrhovec, former member of the SFRY State Presidency, responded to a query of a delegate in the Croatian Assembly concerning the 200 Albanians who have been "isolated." First in the Leskovac District Prison and then in the Central Prison in Belgrade, he spent a total of 49 days—as is already well-known—with no right to investigatory proceedings, indictment, defense, or counsel, with no knowledge as to why he was behind the jail walls, nor how long he would be incarcerated. Only after a month's search and inquiring daily at the Pristina and Gnjilane police departments did his family manage to learn his whereabouts and his legal status. One police institution sent him to another police institution, assuring them that Agim was in that other place....

But in the meantime the prison guards consoled him: "This is not an arrest, this is isolation."

Which was indeed the case: Agim Vllasi, after almost 2 months of imprisonment, has documents which he has kept indicating an arrest which was and was not an arrest. In a decision dated 28 August, Jusuf Karakushi, secretary of the provincial police, "ordered confinement to a particular place," which means—as it is written there—"the aforementioned must reside in the premises of the District Prison in Leskovac...and in view of the fact that the aforementioned's activity is directed toward threatening public order." Then on 15 May, a decision "rescinded the measure of confinement to a particular place" since, in the assessment of the Kosovo police, "the reason why the measure was applied to the aforementioned had terminated."

Neither officially nor unofficially, neither in writing nor orally—did anyone ever explain to the person isolated which or what kind of act he had committed to threaten what is referred to as public order. And if the "facts" did exist, why on the basis of that incrimination—and it is elaborated in several paragraphs in the criminal codes of Yugoslavia, Serbia, and Kosovo—was he not classified as a suspect under normal criminal procedure? He therefore concluded, subjectively it is true, that his sin before the state, the law, and the party was identical with his last name. Agim Vllasi is the nephew of Azem Vllasi,

former provincial leader against whom they have been drawing up an indictment for the crime of Albanian counterrevolution for 3 months, and indeed four conversations between Agim and the police inspector, in the Leskovac and Belgrade Prisons, were devoted to the same topic: Who came to visit his uncle, what company did he keep, what did his uncle talk about with those who visited him, who did he contact in Rabovac, his native village near Kosovska Kamenica, where Vllasi's relatives live and where he has a weekend cottage...?

### The Processing of the People Isolated

"After the fourth interrogation, I wrote a statement. In it, I described in detail how I had helped my uncle build his house and tend his garden," said Agim Vllasi, a person with no political past whatsoever, without even the smallest position of leadership, until recently only an ordinary member of the party organization of the Center for Social Welfare in Kosovska Kamenica. Since recently, not even that. Upon his return from "isolation," there was a decision expelling him from the League of Communists of Yugoslavia waiting for him. The grounds: there is no place for prison inmates in the ranks of the communist vanguard, especially not during the time of universal differentiation.

That same day, 28 March, some of Vllasi's family planned to visit the arrested "counterrevolutionary." That is how the nephew Agim happened to be found in Vllasi's apartment. When three police inspectors in civilian clothes rang the doorbell at 0630 hours and took Agim off to the building of the provincial Secretariat for Internal Affairs in Pristina, he saw there just in passing his brother Selim, also a "person isolated" who even today "is confined to a particular place" better known as the Sabac Prison. Then, like any arrestee, with plastic handcuffs, he was put in one of two buses full of Albanians that departed from Pristina toward "Serbia proper": one toward Vranje and the other toward Leskovac.

Although the provincial authorities would somewhat later be forced to break their own information blockade and acknowledge—according to the most recent announcements—that 237 persons actually were "isolated," on that single day, in one bus trip, about 100 people were taken away, Agim among them. That is nearly half of the number that has been officially confirmed.

"Among those with whom I became acquainted during that trip, I was the only one who did not have an academic title. All the rest were professors, doctors, engineers, directors of various factories in Kosovo," Agim recalls.

They reached Leskovac in the evening, about 1930 hours. While a majority of these strange travelers continued their forced travel, some 20 whose names were called had been led into a long narrow corridor which the police very picturesquely referred to as the "sardine tunnel." Agim Vllasi was the first "isolatee" whom they called into the booking room of the Leskovac District Prison, where there were a table, two chairs, a physician,

and a group of diligent policemen. After he had spelled out his personal data to the "official" and answered the physician's question as to his irreproachable state of health, Agim was ordered to turn his face to the wall. Then the torture began: in the booking room he was beaten by two men, in the corridor between the booking room and the toilet he went through a gauntlet of hands, feet, and billy clubs, and in the toilet three more men. Then they took him to a room apart, told him to undress and sent him to Room No 7. Carrying his suit, he again had to go down the hall between the cordon of police. When he finally entered No 7—1 of 10 similarly marked prison huts—he found 3 men also naked who had been beaten but whose "isolation" processing had been somewhat shorter: an Albanian whose name he did not recall, Dr Rexhep Ismaili, albanologist, and Xheradin Rekalli, a mechanical engineer. The only other thing was that the prison guard peered into that particular place and struck Rexhep once or twice, since, he said, "that one had it coming," and then the door was locked.

"Only the next morning did I realize I was in prison," Agim Vllasi relates. "First, they brought me breakfast, tea with no sugar and a piece of bread. We didn't touch it. Our neck muscles were so swollen that we were unable to swallow. About 1000 hours, they called us one by one into the booking office and presented us the official document on isolation."

"This decision may be appealed to the Executive Council of SAP Kosovo," it states. BORBA would therefore publish, and Yusuf Karakushi would publicly guarantee that all the isolatees had actually appealed to the Kosovo Government. However, all the appeals had been rejected.

"I did not appeal," Agim says, "none of the four of us appealed. Perhaps I would have, had they given me paper and a pencil."

### In Belgrade

They also beat him on the second day of the "confinement to a particular place." But on the third day of incarceration, on 31 March, some unnamed group from official quarters did begin to investigate the "isolation" conditions in the Leskovac Prison. This was a two-member commission from the State Security Service of the Kosovo Secretariat for Internal Affairs, consisting of an Albanian and a Serb who promised proper treatment, no beating. It was also to them that Agim made his first oral statement: "They asked me whether I knew why I was here. I answered: because of my last name."

Lying down as ordered at 2200 hours, getting up as ordered at 0500 hours, with no newspapers, books, paper, or pencil, at first without cigarettes, and truly completely isolated from the outside world and his own family, that is how he spent something more than 10 days. He changed cells in the meantime, so that he came to know other isolatees: Ramadan Krasniqi, a professor from Klina, Xhemal Plan, a teacher from Vucitrn, and a man whose first name was Adem, an engineer in the "Amortizer" Work Organization, whose last name he

could not recall. And then they loaded him once again into a full bus and took him off to Belgrade together with some 50 people ordered to continue their isolation in the Central Belgrade Prison. Here, he says, the reception was altogether correct, no insults or billy clubs. A physician carefully examined him and entered on his card the symptoms of all the injuries inflicted with hands and shoes. They were given newspapers for the first time and the right to 2 hours of daily activity between 1400 and 1600 hours, a chess board, and the opportunity to go to the prison canteen and back. This time he shared a cell with four Albanians: Zimber Zimberaj, deputy general director of the "Djeravice" RO, Anton Kollaj, a teacher of Marxism from Klina, Azem Sadikaj, technical director of "Radusa" of Istok, and a certain Shefqet, a worker from Podujevo whose last name he could not recall. He wrote his first letter from the Central Prison in Belgrade. It was in the Belgrade Central Prison that he received the Decision on Termination of Isolation 49 days after his arrest. A bus took him and a few others who were no longer isolates to the place where they had been picked up....

But in the meantime his other brother had been discharged, temporarily it was said, from his job in the Kosovska Kamenica branch of Niteks of Nis. His father had been sentenced to a month in prison since according to witnesses a few months before, in a coffeehouse, a bit under the influence, he had committed a verbal crime in defending Azem Vllasi.

Meanwhile in the Presidium of the Provincial Committee of the Kosovo LC, they repeated some of the old arguments concerning the justifiability, lawfulness, and constitutionality of the isolation orders: Yusuf Karakushi, that is, was to say at about that time, "That the taking of this measure was justified is confirmed by the figures—so far criminal proceedings for hostile activity have been instituted against 23 of those persons, 12 of them have been punished for misdemeanors, and criminal charges are in the final phase against 28. So far, 50 persons have been discharged from isolation, while another 150 are still subject to this measure. Criminal proceedings will be instituted against a number of them, while the rest will be released when the circumstances allow. The third group will be detained so long as there is a danger of their activity under the emergency conditions." In short, interpreting "restriction of freedom of movement" as the discretionary right of the police to deprive people entirely of their freedom, the Kosovo chief of police is not answering the most important question: Who will ever again be able to prove to those people that they do, after all, live in a state based on law?

#### **Growing Youth Faction 'Separate' From Slovene Party**

28000137 Zagreb VJESNIK (PANORAMA SUBOTOM Supplement) in Serbo-Croatian 3 Jun 89 p 1

[Article by Milan Jaksic: "Ideological Split"]

[Text] As soon as pressures from outside are relaxed in Slovenia, "a hundred flowers begin to blossom" and it

becomes increasingly clear that young people with their left-wing orientation and European mindset want to be partners of the League of Communists.

Slovene ideological homogenization, often equated with national homogenization, seems at this time to have become irrelevant to Slovenes now that a noticeable ideological split has taken place on the public political scene in Trg osvoboditve [Liberation Square] in this republic of ours. The different approaches to the new political animation there are not of recent date. Slovenes manifested them spontaneously, in the process resorting to dialog rather than the confrontation which would have taken place in the atmosphere of exclusivity or preferential position of any political organization (of any school of thought) at the expense of another. It was a question here of attitudes toward current policy or new political movements which might replace previously existing deficient ones.

However, verbal rapprochement would occur in situations in the Slovene political arena if someone from outside were to launch any arrows at Slovenia that the Slovenes considered to be unprincipled. Then, the reactions to criticism aimed at this republic from outside would emerge as homogenization based on the original constitutional principles of national sovereignty. Everything returns to a certain new calm when "a hundred flowers begin to blossom" on the Slovene political scene; slowly but surely an ideologically fluid atmosphere forms where "the national" as a key political category becomes a characteristic only of works of the intellect or is a key modifier of one part of the Slovene alternative. Joze Smole, president of the Slovene Front, spoke in these terms recently to Yugoslav journalists who were invited there by the Republic Committee for Information, saying in effect that homogenization in national terms has not happened at all in Slovenia, although he does not dispute its emergence as a result of dire necessity. Hence his thesis is that homogenization in Slovenia is only a reaction to various pressures of a unitarian nature.

#### **Differences**

Ideological differences in Slovenia itself in such situations are giving way to increasingly frequent disputes among Slovenes themselves exclusively on the point of whether this leadership is opposing energetically enough the pressures to which this republic is being subjected. Young Slovenes would say that the problems pressing on either Slovenia or Yugoslavia are trivialized in such circumstances, in that they believe that more attention should be paid to so-called minor matters because the major ones (provided for in the Constitution and especially by federal principles) should be taken care of automatically. Either that or they advocate a layered approach to erection of a much stronger federal structure whose pyramid should rest on the foundation of clearcut democratic rules, obviously ones differing from those currently in effect in Slovenia, a market economy, and orientation toward the most developed parts of Europe.

Hence Slovene realities have two dimensions which only seem to be mutually exclusive. One is defensive, caused by outside pressures, although others will say that unitarian tendencies may appear also as a result of internal separatist ones. The other is something taking place in this gap dividing interethnic political relations from internal Slovene ones. If overheating occurs in these interethnic relations (especially when attacks directly against Slovenia are involved), this internal tendency toward democratic movements will be checked, but economic relations should proceed fairly well despite the stormy political skirmishes taking place in relations broader than the internal Slovene ones. Thus we come up against yet another interesting contradiction, which obviously is merely formal in nature. Slovenes will continue to insist stubbornly on their sovereignty, construing it to include economic sovereignty, but this will not, for example, prevent their company Slovenijavino from expanding its operations over all of Yugoslavia.

Consequently, we might regard the push for economic sovereignty as a sort of standby option in the resolution of aggregate political relationships, or as the last retreat if it is oppressive to the extent that our own sovereignty must be defended by precisely worded constitutional provisions. We might have anticipated similar arguments if it were a question of trying to insert into our Constitution the "right to secede," because this constitutional category, also an option of the last resort, would provide a means to oppose any restrictions on free human initiative or free circulation of capital. And so we will retrace our steps to the local ideological split, whose slowdown is probably only temporary, because the differences between the various political movements are already so pronounced or so clearly defined that Slovenia cannot and probably will not be able to avoid them in the future. The question is whether others can avoid them, inasmuch as their infiltration into Yugoslavia at large is a natural result both of our current crisis and of any mandatory doctrinal or entirely practical reconstruction of the entire system.

### Factions

Smole has given us precise views of three separate factions in Slovene politics. Of these, the League of Communists is currently in a highly problematical situation. The Youth League fits in another faction, while an alternative political group which obviously is not unified belongs to the third. The League of Communists of Slovenia has gained a considerable amount of capital by allowing the Socialist League to emerge from hiding behind its skirts, thereby unleashing the entire Slovene democratic initiative. But the League of Communists' has a problem of its own, that of membership, since the number of young people joining the League is small. Consequently, its membership is declining day by day. Nor is the position of workers in the League of Communists what it used to be, and also continues to decline. The League of Communists is endangered above all by its failure to regenerate itself.

The Youth League, on the other hand is increasingly consolidating its position as a separate political organization or a companion piece to the League of Communists itself, and in doing so is abandoning the concept of a classic youth organization.

Of the 10 most prominent leaders of the Slovene Youth leadership, only two belong to a communist organization. But this is no obstacle at all to young people in the ever clearer definition of their left-wing orientation and the European option as the prospects most acceptable to youth. Hence the League of Communists of Slovenia has arrived at a situation that might completely isolate it from young people, who less and less regard membership in the League of Communists as essential for asserting of their political or bread-and-butter interests. Consequently, the question is whether Smole is only joking or if there is considerable truth in this joke; he told journalists off the record that the League of Communists of Slovenia will have to reestablish a League of Communist Youth of Yugoslavia of its own.

We will of course watch to see if these democratic processes continue to develop without any restrictions or if there will be a situation connected with these restrictions caused by the dispute between Slovene leaders and other leaders. The question of who started the argument is not so important, because slowdowns occur independently of the answer even where freedom of thought has been most pronounced. That has been in the area of the alternative political organizations, which recently clashed with each other sharply over a basic ideological concept, that of whether interethnic concerns or liberal concerns are to be given priority in the program. The national dimension of these disputes is more and more moving to another level. Even if the interethnic political relations in Yugoslavia are not further aggravated, it probably will be very difficult to surmount the problem of such relations in Slovenia. Both representatives of the politics wielding the greatest power in Slovenia and liberally oriented intellectuals speak of Dimitri Rupel and Franc Tomsic as the Slovene right, at the same time offering, as a substitute for our proverbial voluntarism or for firmly entrenched collectivism as the product of a party of the bolshevik type, the utilitarianism of man, the individual, his interests, his creative commitment, and his personality as an ideological universe alien to any boundaries or to our customary division on an ethnic, regional, provincial, or republic basis.

**President of League of Socialist Youth Interviewed**  
28000139 Belgrade INTERVJU in Serbo-Croatian  
12 May 89 pp 4-7

[Interview with Branko Greganovic, president of the Presidency of the Conference of the Yugoslav Socialist Youth League, by Jasmina Lekic: "As If They Do Not See Me"; date and place not given]

[Text] We believe that everyone will agree immediately on at least one thing about Branko Greganovic, president of the Presidency of the Conference of the Socialist

Youth League of Yugoslavia [SSOJ]: that he is a young man who doesn't mince words, a characteristic which, after all, has not often graced individuals in that office.

That is the reason for our first question (by the way, Greganovic agreed to this interview without delay).

[INTERVJU] It could be said that you have your own judgment about everything and that you express it without reservation. Is that a reflection of your own character, or the new times?

[Greganovic] It is symptomatic that people are surprised that I have my own judgment. In a certain impertinent interpretation, that would mean that we have become used to politicians without their own judgment. New times? Perhaps for Yugoslavia such an attitude really is a sign of new times, but for serious, modern states, it is not.

As for my character, I will say this: those who decide on politics, as I have, must be consciously ambitious. In healthy circumstances, people without ambitions do not decide on politics, because that primarily means that you push forward your name, your face, your personality—the most that a person has. In doing so, your only weapon is speech, frank conversation, and arguments good enough that someone will listen to them. It is another matter that for so long politics in Yugoslavia has been conducted by those who did not know what they wanted, or did not have their own judgment with which to come before the public. That is a feature of authoritarian politics which does not need the public's judgment. It can also be recognized by the fact that all the speeches "in the name of the people," or in our case "in the name of youth," fall into the water.

[INTERVJU] To what extent does the office you are in free your hands? In other words, how much real influence do you have?

[Greganovic] Coming to this post, I wrote somewhere that here the individual is everything and nothing. Everything, because whether something will make progress depends on him; and nothing, when he realizes that by himself, however, he cannot jump over those obstacles which have accumulated for many years. Influence? Realistically, we are not included, nor do we have any influence, in making the key decisions. That means that very little is directly dependent upon us. That is why our greatest influence is actually through the public. Our influence reaches out to the extent that we are present in it.

I must add that we have a considerable presence in the SFRY Assembly as well. Our Kosovo program went through, and we are now very active on environmental issues, as well as radio broadcasting—in the sense of ensuring the monitoring of all Yugoslav radio and television programs throughout the entire Yugoslav territory. But so what? The SFRY Assembly is not the place where the key decisions are made, so that everything is pretty much in vain.

[INTERVJU] And where are the decisions made?

[Greganovic] In principle, that is the greatest problem of this job. The question is not whether you are willing to take the risk for something, but that you do not get into a situation of taking risks at all. If there were political competition in this country, with everyone offering his program, method, and goal, and participating in definitely resolving things in accordance with modern rules of behavior, then this job would be much more inspiring and interesting.

And where are the decisions made? I think that in Yugoslavia the problem is precisely that no decisions are made at all, certainly not in the sense of a Yugoslav vision of development.

[INTERVJU] How, then?

[Greganovic] In such a way that official politics only reacts to "yesterday," but I think that the imperative of this situation lies precisely in first of all knowing what we want, and measuring the present by the criteria of tomorrow, and not measuring tomorrow by the parameters of the present. All together, this constitutes the extreme impotence of Yugoslav politics, and of the entire Yugoslav political system. There is no vision. We all deal with anything and everything.

[INTERVJU] Things are changing, however, and in some fields even drastically, not to mention the fact that today much more is known about the past. We are almost bombarded with certain secrets that until yesterday were strictly protected...

[Greganovic] No, that is not any kind of opening up! As Vukasin Micunovic said at one meeting, "In the country of the verbal misdemeanor, the secret ballot is the peak of democracy." That is how it is in any case, you know, in a country in which for 45 years everything has literally been hidden, and so a few published facts suddenly become a sign of great freedom. Things have to be opened up completely in order for us to be able to speak seriously and competently about our past.

[INTERVJU] To what would you give priority?

[Greganovic] First of all, it is necessary to bring to light all the experiences of the multiparty system in postwar Yugoslavia (from 1946 to 1965), then the issue of political condemnations, and then many issues related to the constitutional order; it is necessary finally to open up all the historical archives, and the entire historical memory concerning Kosovo... There are dimensions that we simply do not know, but that are active behind the scenes somewhere without anyone knowing what they are about. Here and there something comes out in some column, but it is a pitiful country that writes its history in columns. By fearing our past, we will always return to it again.

Why is it that the discussion about Kosovo has never been seriously and fully opened up? People have always wriggled around the surface of everyday politics, and that is not good, because those everyday political tensions have become so naive and so transparent that they



cannot even clarify themselves. They can only be clarified by the logic of the development of events. I would like to say, however, that clarification of the past would not interest me in the sense of clearing up old unsettled accounts, but solely as experience oriented toward the future. I am certain that the awakening of historical memory would influence the overall situation in Yugoslavia.

[INTERVJU] Perhaps the total truth would set us against each other even more?

[Greganovic] It is not a question of the truth, but of the facts! You know how it is with the truth? One of our positions is precisely as follows: true and false opinions do not exist, correct and wrong opinions do not exist; there are only different opinions. Ours is only one of them. The facts are one thing, and value judgments are another, and people must be granted the right to have different value judgments.

As for the truth setting us even more against each other, I see the problem as being more your question than my answer. Since what lies behind your question is the peoples and nationalities of Yugoslavia, and thinking about the state in the category of nations, I think that there is no scope for a serious discussion. Here, I will be even more direct: first we have to learn to live with our past, and I know that in this regard many people's criticism would be precisely that—how the truth will set us against each other. Those things are not forgotten, nor can they be abolished by decree; they are passed on from generation to generation, and the problem is forgetting them, but rather remembering them and keeping them from being repeated. Unfortunately, in Yugoslavia an official attempt has been made to forget all that, but it is impossible.

[INTERVJU] How much is youth affected by Yugoslav disunity, and how much will you encounter it in your work, and in life?

[Greganovic] I do not accept the concept of Yugoslav disunity! That is one more mask for the old politics' fear of a modern Yugoslavia. It is not a question of a process of disunification, but rather a process of the general pluralization of the entire area. That process is a necessary precondition for a new society, if Yugoslavia wants to meet the challenges of the 21st century. That situation appears to be disunity only to those who are used to a monolithic Yugoslavia, who have become used to thinking and speaking in the name of the people, and who are used to having the people think uniformly and always agree with them. It appears to them to be a collapse, but to me to be the creation of a new Yugoslavia.

The possibility of manipulation of what perhaps I may call the quasi-disunification is assisted by one elementary fact: for 45 years now a unified area of communication has not been built in Yugoslavia, and thus we know more about what is happening in Africa and Asia than in some part of our own country. How, then, can we consider it our own area? It is interesting that there is not even any interest in doing this. The only thing that comes

to mind is to have one TV daily news program for all of Yugoslavia. The Middle Ages!

Because of the political system, and in general the way politics functions in Yugoslavia, the impression is created that the pluralization of opinions is territorially distributed, which is not true at all, because if there is only one person who is different in a region, then it is not true.

[INTERVJU] What kind of Yugoslavia would you like?

[Greganovic] A Yugoslavia that would be a modern state, determined by several things: human rights; functional productivity, from the security of persons and property to clean streets; and finally, a country that would guarantee the freedom of everyone, and not the authority of a few, regardless of what historical attributes are ascribed to those few. We are also insisting on the quality of life: it should be realized for once that politicians are here to build us an infrastructure, and not to arbitrate the truth for us, and determine what is good for us and what is not. This also implies that we favor a market economy. All of these things should be interpreted in terms of AVNOJ [Antifascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia] Yugoslavia, but not in those vulgar ways in which Yugoslavia is viewed today as a state of associated feudal possessions, but rather in the sense that the equality of republics and provinces is a guarantee of the equality of peoples and nationalities.

[INTERVJU] What do you think—what are the chances for that vision?

[Greganovic] There are chances; I hope that there are. As long as I think there are, I will be here, in my position and in Yugoslavia. This is not a question of any morale, but rather of the fact that world events are competing with us. If we know that, then we must behave accordingly. My guarantee is the last one that still belongs in some way to the old times. You should see the generations that are coming! We are nothing! Generations are coming that are a miracle, but we are playing here, and even literally fooling around with Yugoslavia.

As far as that playing is concerned, there is a clear line of demarcation: either you are for the creation of a modern state, or you are not. And who, of the official politicians in Yugoslavia today, is fighting for it? To me, the solution is not to go from a one-party system to eight one-party systems. I am completely indifferent as to who will jail me.

[INTERVJU] In your opinion, what is the essential cause of the situation that you are so bitterly attacking?

[Greganovic] The essential cause is the political system. It is built on the assumption of a conflictless society, on the assumption of a totalitarian society; it is only an unnecessary decoration around authority. It is a system that is not capable of dealing with divergence and social pluralism in any other way than by coercion. Now, you know, there is a great deal of discussion about political pluralism—yes or no. That sort of discussion actually



conceals the real question: do you want to punish someone for being different, or not? It is never put like that, however, although that is the way it is always carried out in practice. I see a way out in legalizing social and political pluralism, establishing the foundations of a conflict society and rules of conduct for a conflict society, and building institutions that are capable of balancing those interests. Essentially, it is very simple, because then it would be a functional state and not an ideological one.

[INTERVJU] How much are you "infected by politics," and how much does that involvement hamper you in what we usually call private life?

[Greganovic] In Yugoslavia—precisely because politics has never functioned in the way that I have just described—we are only now studying some sort of culture of public speech and public work. We are still brought up according to the principle that those who appear on television do not live on the ground. This job, if it is done as we in the SSOJ Presidency do it—that is, with considerable public exposure—naturally encroaches on our private lives. I perceive this in two ways: first, that people recognize me, and second, that I have to watch my words in this Yugoslav chaos, and that naturally carries over to the private level as well. Consequently, that impact naturally exists, although I think that a serious politician has to count on it, and has to win, no matter how arrogant it appears, the right to his own privacy and has to ensure the way of life that that allows.

[INTERVJU] Any post, especially in our country, brings certain privileges. Do you have them?

[Greganovic] You know, a person learns to live with it, although it is very important to realize that it is not the sole meaning of his professional work. What is usually called privileges is a necessary precondition for this work. For instance, an official car! In modern business an airplane is even necessary, because communication is everything, and time is everything. Kilometers are no longer involved at all. That can be seen even in my work, not to mention the case of certain bigger and more difficult tasks. Unfortunately, in our country people look less at results, and more at who drives what car, which is only proof that in the past politicians could not be criticized. The solution is really not to lower a politician's salary and take away his car, but rather to replace the incompetent and bring in those who will merit both the salary and the car.

Since you are insisting on it, I will tell you that each month I receive about 400 million old dinars, that I live in a small official apartment with 30 square meters in the center of Belgrade, and that I have an official car available, but only for work. Furthermore, let us not forget that those privileges are associated only with a certain period, until the end of my term. And that in these stormy times, no one knows what awaits you afterwards...

[INTERVJU] Then you would not do this job voluntarily?

[Greganovic] No, not by any means! But I would like us to be viewed from a different angle: of assessing our initiatives, our advocacy, and our programs. If I asked myself personally, I think that I could have a bigger salary and live in a bigger apartment. You cannot expect a modern politician to have a low salary and barely live. Let me add to this a general truth—in a modern society you have to fight against poverty, and not wealth. One director from Zagreb said, "If we had fought against poverty in Yugoslavia after the war as much as we had fought against wealth, we would already be a socialist Switzerland." In that sense, our viewpoint has been seriously poisoned by Bolshevik morality, with certain strong traits of Stalinism.

[INTERVJU] You think that the results of political workers can be precisely measured, and that it is not being done today?

[Greganovic] Yes, according to the existing criteria it is even easier to work in Yugoslav politics today. You wait for someone to make a crude political move, you quickly convene a meeting, you summon journalists, you disassociate yourself, you condemn, you repeat a few strong sentences—and you finish your work. It is tragic that even the issue of Kosovo is viewed from that angle. You do not have to offer any solutions. All that you have to do is condemn Albanian nationalism and separatism on two typed pages, and that is enough. That is how it goes from year to year. A few days ago I said at the Presidency of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia [SAWPY], "Look at these positions of yours that you are writing today and those from previous years; they are all the same." What else has to happen in Kosovo and in Yugoslavia in order for us to realize this?

[INTERVJU] Do you consider Kosovo this country's biggest problem?

[Greganovic] I do not recognize little and big problems. Everyone perceives his own problems as the biggest ones, and he should be granted that right and given the opportunity to solve them. What I mean to say is that problems should not be compared but solved, through a clear selective policy. What is hidden behind the philosophy of big and little problems? An authoritarian regime. The greatest difficulty in Kosovo is that the genesis of the problem is completely identical to the genesis of the problems throughout all of Yugoslavia. Those who are dealing with the problem of Kosovo are being confronted in Kosovo with their own mistakes, with the mistakes of their policy and their political methods, which I call the discreet charm of political voluntarism. I am thinking about the so-called work among the masses, the implementation of political positions, and the issue of certain indoctrinations... Kosovo is actually proof of the failure of such a policy, such methods, and that Akentasche activism. It is all some sort of sermon on love. Will someone realize that that is precisely what brought us where we are? The people around us are seeking help, and not compassion.

[INTERVJU] How much have you personally been involved with the issue of Kosovo?

[Gregarovic] You see, I often hear politicians who say, "We were down there and talked man-to-man with the Albanians." I was there several times: in November in Pec, at two schools. I will not consider my policy effective until the toilets in those schools are cleaned, windows are installed, blackboards are put in, heating is installed, and there is asphalt in front of the schools. That, to me, is politics. How can I talk to them, in such circumstances, about interethnic relations? They cannot live, much less like themselves. Politics should give those people in Kosovo a real alternative in life, and not promises that resound in schoolrooms and founder in the mud of unlit streets. The problem in Kosovo will not be solved until there is a general stabilization of the situation in Yugoslavia, because the causes of the crisis are the same. A lawful state will not function in Kosovo until it functions in other parts, but it is not functioning anywhere in this country.

[INTERVJU] How do you view the fact that most of those participating in the Kosovo demonstrations were young people, and even quite young ones. Doesn't that affect the SSOJ in particular?

[Gregarovic] Yes, it is true that many young people in Kosovo have been lost. But we have also made a lot of mistakes. For instance, we did not always see the difference between a violent crime and a verbal misdemeanor. In that chaos of Kosovo reality, in which not even land registries exist, without a resocialization program, we are now surprised by all of that. There is nothing to be surprised about! And the situation is really bad there, especially with young people. Our organization in Kosovo is no better or worse than elsewhere in the country, but there it has really had a hard time. It copes as well as it can, but I am not thinking because of that about who should be replaced there and how; instead, I think that it is necessary to do what we are doing now throughout our entire organization, i.e., the general consolidation of the SSOJ.

It should be emphasized that my colleagues in Kosovo are trapped even more firmly in the vicious circle of everyday politics. It is tragic, you know, that all that has happened in Kosovo is happening, and that only the Central Committee and the committees for Nationwide Defense and the sociopolitical communities [DSZ] have met there. That is how things have been resolved for decades, and obviously it is not successful. That is why the state of emergency logically and justifiably occurred there. Back in September 1988 I said in one esteemed political society, "Let's include the Assembly," but they told me, "No, no, what Assembly!" That is the philosophy of the old politics that does not go beyond the Central Committee, and sees its function as everything. I have been trumpeting about that so much that I have bored myself, God, and the people.

[INTERVJU] You sometimes say that you are not a member of the LCY?

[Gregarovic] No, I am speaking precisely as a member of the LCY, but a modern LCY that does not seek a historical mandate for being the vanguard, but rather confirms its program commitments through its concrete visionary initiative, in competition with other social initiatives.

[INTERVJU] What would you like to do after the end of your term?

[Gregarovic] We will see what the job market says. My interests would be either some further graduate study abroad, or business, or work in the Executive Council. I am thus interested in efficiency, in whether I can be useful. After all, it was through the job market that I got into politics. Until 4-5 years ago I was a typical youth, which means that I really did not even know what the youth organization was, nor was I interested in it. I lived and studied economics in Maribor, was involved with music, and then came to be managing editor of KATEDRA; then, by chance, I became president of the University Conference and then a member of the Republic Conference of the Presidency of the Slovene SSO. That is how I reached a point where I had to become independent. I looked around at what was being offered to me, and at one time I had the opportunity to languish for 3-4 years in some accounting office or definitely go into politics. In accordance with a certain ambitious nature of mine, I decided to take up politics as a profession, I came to Belgrade, and I soon became president of the SSOJ.

[INTERVJU] A rapid career; but are you still thinking about leaving Yugoslavia?

[Gregarovic] Yes, it really has been a rapid career, and surprisingly rapid for me. I think that the best side of the whole affair is that I perceive my job in an extremely professional manner. That means that I try to be as clear, effective, and direct as possible. The fact that I may possibly leave Yugoslavia, or perhaps only politics, can be explained by what politics is to someone. To me, it is contained in the assembly system and the executive council. The rest is ideological arbitration, boring people. Furthermore, as a person I cannot stand a situation in which I am responsible for something over which I do not have any influence. And that, to a great extent, is what my work and our work in the SSOJ consists of.

[INTERVJU] How do the politicians view you, the older and more powerful ones?

[Gregarovic] They do not even see me. Apparently they still believe that they can settle everything themselves, among themselves.

**Secrecy, Illegality of Isolation Measures Deplored**  
*28000136b Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian*  
30 May 89 p 12

[Article by Nenad Zakosek, member of the Executive Committee of the Association for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative, Zagreb: "The Uncontrolled Violence of the State"]

[Text] After a shameful delay of more than a month, and then not thanks to information provided by the competent government agencies, but because of the initiative of

interested individuals, the Yugoslav public learned that an "indefinite" number of citizens of Kosovo (50, 100, 200, 500) literally disappeared. Official sources referred to the status of these citizens as "isolation," based on Article 53 of the provincial Law on Internal Affairs, which "under extraordinary circumstances" (whose existence is decided by the presidency of the province) gives police authorities the right, without any control of the courts or assembly, so long as the "extraordinary circumstances" persist (and no time limit has been put on them), to restrict the movement of persons when there exists even a "warranted suspicion" that they might threaten the constitutional order. The public statements made so far by competent individuals have mainly made an issue of this "restriction of movement," disputing that "isolation" can be based on the provisions of law now in effect, which, incidentally, are nothing specific to Kosovo, since they exist in the respective laws of the other federal units. However, in spite of certain public inquiries and objections, this is the way matters still stand:

- for more than 2 months now an "indefinite number" of citizens have been detained, deported to an unspecified place, and denied all contact with relatives or counsel, yet neither misdemeanor nor criminal proceedings have been instituted against them;
- although this is without any legal basis whatsoever, not a single police department in Kosovo, Serbia, or Yugoslavia has issued accurate data on persons who have been "isolated" in this way or on the place where they are being kept (the figures given on 23 May—and that in a meeting of the presidium of the provincial party—by Karakushi, the provincial secretary for internal affairs, are so imprecise and contradictory that they cause additional confusion: he spoke of 237 "isolatees," and then he mentioned in general terms criminal charges or indeed only misdemeanor charges against a much smaller number of persons: instead of this kind of half-information the public has the right to know the precise list of persons "isolated," the charges against them, the reasons why regular court proceedings were omitted, and the manner and place of executing "isolation");
- although there are serious doubts about the foundation for "isolation" in the provisions of law now in effect, not a single court or assembly or parliamentary body has initiated reexamination of the practice of police departments, nor have they offered a competent interpretation of the present legal provisions concerning the problem of "isolation."

All of this indicates the outrageous arrogance of government authority which has been given powers unlimited by law and not subject to public oversight to use violence against its own citizens, justified merely by reference to the "state of emergency." In spite of the very plausibly argued doubts which have been expressed so far, perhaps the present provisions of the law do actually "cover" the actions of the authorities who have been "isolating" their own citizens (it is significant that the law itself does

not envisage a judicial authority that would provide an authentic interpretation of those provisions or assess the validity of actions of the police, nor has an assessment of the constitutionality of the actions of those agencies been issued by a constitutional court, which by definition would be competent to do so. However, the basic problem is not whether this type of repression by the state is legally justified, but rather the character of the law itself which (possibly) allows this.

There is an immense difference between a mere legal form which can be used to cloak the powers of the government authority to use violence against its citizens and that conception of the law which presupposes existence of a clearly defined area of inalienable freedoms of individuals and therefore a firm guarantee of their preservation, as well as a precisely regulated procedure for restricting them, which would incorporate a number of steps of control. Even the most authoritarian government power tried to give legal form to organized repression. Hitler's policy of discrimination and eradication of the Jews was covered by the racial laws, the criminal code of Stalin's Soviet Union was a satisfactory basis for large-scale terror carried out by the state.

Relying on the distinction between the mere legal form and law in the sense previously indicated, it is easy to ascertain that a legal provision which is used to justify "isolation" of citizens provides the foundation for the power of government agencies, utterly contrary to the spirit of the law, to arbitrarily apply violence against citizens without control. "Exceptional circumstances" are a sufficient condition, without any court order whatsoever, for police authorities to "prohibit the movement" or even take away the freedom of arbitrarily designated "persons whose activity is directed, or there is warranted suspicion that it might be directed, or to threaten the order established by the Constitution or public peace and order" (the quotation is taken from the Croatian Law on Internal Affairs, NARODNE NOVINE, No 44, 1979). A very similar rationale was used by the authorities in Germany between 1933 and 1945 in sending people they found objectionable to concentration camps without judicial proceedings.

The phenomenon of "isolation" and the legal provisions which stand behind it ought to be an occasion for making a public issue of the entire area of legal regulation of government repression in our country, which has been displaced from the awareness of citizens. This especially applies to the powers of government agencies—and even of "cryptogovernmental" bodies like the various committees for nationwide defense and social self-protection—to apply repressive measures in "extraordinary circumstances," without judicial oversight, against persons who are very imprecisely indicated, which allows for completely arbitrary actions by the authorities. But this also applies to "ordinary" repression under "normal" circumstances, which is based first of all on vague and imprecise legal definitions of political crimes and crimes of thought and which is therefore manifested in political trials and in general the possibility that the authorities can harass

objectionable persons. Finally, this also applies to the SFRY Constitution, which does not contain a clear guarantee of human rights and particularly does not make it possible for them to be protected against the arbitrariness of government agencies.

Unless the principles of law are consistently respected, citizens cannot protect themselves against the violence of

the state. That is why that principle should be consistently incorporated first of all into the new Yugoslav Constitution (which should also precisely define the state of emergency and the measures suitable to it, which must not contradict that principle) as well as in all other laws regulating government use of violence. In such a system, there will be no place for "isolation," that is an absolute certainty.

## INTRABLOC

### Warsaw Pact Force Reductions Assessed

23000187 Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK  
in German No 6, Jun 89 pp 400-401

[Article by Arno Krakau and Ole Diehl: "Unilateral Arms Reductions by Warsaw Pact, and Quantitative Force Relationship in Europe"]

[Text] In the aftermath of the announcement of unilateral arms cuts by the Soviet Union by Gorbachev in his 7 December 1988 address to the UN General Assembly the smaller Warsaw Pact nations with the exception of Romania have also let it be known that they will unilaterally cut their armed forces and weapons arsenals over the next 2 years. The quick succession of the cuts announced by these nations in January and February 1989 led to a situation in which even Soviet Defense Minister Yazov was still speaking of the same figures in a 27 February PRAVDA interview, i.e. 296,300 men, almost 12,000 tanks, 9,130 artillery systems and 930 combat aircraft, as Chervov had in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 2 February. Quite obviously, Yazov failed to take the cuts in the Polish armed forces announced on 26 February by Defense Minister Siwicki.

The cuts announced by the Warsaw Pact nations thus far add up to a reduction in personnel strength by 321,300 men by the end of 1990. The number of battle tanks is to be cut by 12,750; that of armored personnel carriers and other combat vehicles by 975; the artillery systems by 10,030 and the combat aircraft by 930. (See table below)

The announcement of these arms cuts is closely tied to the first ever publication by the Warsaw Pact in late January 1989 of comprehensive official figures on armed forces strength entitled "On the Comparative Numerical Strength of the Armed Forces and Armaments of the Warsaw Pact Organization and the North Atlantic Alliance in Europe and the Contiguous Maritime Regions." In it, the Warsaw Pact specifically criticizes the relative-force-capabilities document entitled "Conventional Armed Forces in Europe" submitted by NATO in November 1988, calling it "one-sided, tendentious and based on a selective approach."

In view of the fact that the figures cited in the two documents have been the subject of frequent and exhaustive discussion, we will restrict ourselves to examining both assessments of relative force capabilities for the impact of the announced East bloc reductions on the relative balance of forces as regards troop strength and main weapons categories in the ground and air forces, e.g. battle tanks, artillery, armored personnel carriers, attack helicopters and combat aircraft. To do this, the figures contained in the Warsaw Pact document have been adjusted where necessary and possible to include cuts in naval forces.

Even using the Warsaw Pact figures, we can demonstrate a Warsaw Pact relative superiority with differences in the

various categories. According to the Warsaw Pact figures, the East bloc's superiority in battle tanks would be reduced from 1.9:1 to 1.5:1; in artillery systems from 1.3:1 to 1.1:1 and in combat aircraft from 1.3:1 to an even balance. The troop strength ratio would also decline from 1.1:1 to an even balance. But in armored personnel carriers and attack helicopters, the ratio would remain unchanged.

The NATO document adds up to a far more definite relative superiority of the Warsaw Pact although the absolute figures contained in it are generally lower. An assessment of the impact of the announced Warsaw Pact reductions on the relative balance of forces on the basis of the NATO document presents difficulties in view of the differences in the categories cited in the two documents. For instance, when the Warsaw Pact announces cuts in battle tanks or artillery, it must be assumed that this refers to weapon systems which correspond to the broader definitions used in the East bloc document. The reductions might also affect systems which have not been included under the same category designation in the Western document at all, e.g. light tanks or light artillery systems of less than 100 millimeters. The Warsaw Pact announcements thus far have made concrete reference only to the fact that the cut in Soviet battle tanks refers to "5,300 of the most modern" models whereas the cuts in combat aircraft merely suggest that these would include attack aircraft.

Going on the assumption that the announced cuts could be subsumed under the categories listed in the NATO document after all, the relative balance of forces in battle tanks would decline from 3.1:1 to 2.4:1 in the Warsaw Pact's favor on the basis of these figures; in artillery systems from 3:1 to 2.3:1; in combat aircraft from 2.4:1 to 2.3:1 and in troop strength from 1.4:1 to 1.3:1. In armored personnel carriers, the balance of forces would shift slightly from 2.4:1 to 2.3:1 and in attack helicopters it would remain unchanged as above.

Based on the East bloc document figures, there would thus be approximate parity in troop strength, combat aircraft and artillery systems once the announced cuts were actually carried out. The superiority in battle tanks admitted in the Warsaw Pact document would be cut in half, but there would only be a slight reduction in armored personnel carriers and combat vehicles. Going on the assumption cited above and using the NATO figures instead, however, the Warsaw Pact continues to enjoy substantial superiority in all the abovementioned categories even if the announced unilateral reductions are factored into the equation.

The relative force capabilities document prepared by the Warsaw Pact may be intended to buttress the East bloc contention of "approximate parity" in connection with the unilateral arms reductions. At this time, this is being attempted specifically by the inclusion of naval forces in the balance of forces. Following implementation of the announced unilateral cuts, an effort is likely to be made to document parity in ground and air forces as well.

Thus, the Warsaw Pact relative force capabilities document serves as an argument to buttress basic Eastern positions on arms control in Europe, particularly with an eye to Western public opinion.

#### Announced Unilateral Cuts by the Warsaw Pact

	USSR	Other WP States	Total
Personnel	240,000	81,300	321,300
Battle tanks	10,000	2,750	12,750
Armored personnel carriers/combat vehicles		975	975
Artillery systems	8,500	1,530	10,030
Combat aircraft	800	130	930

### POLAND

#### Silesian Military District Restructuring: Benefits to Economy

26000560 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish  
12 Jun 89 p 3

[Interview with Gen Div Henryk Szumski, commander, Slask [Silesian] Military District, by Andrzej Jurczynski: "Restructuring in the Slask Military District: Effectively and Economically"; date and place not given; first paragraph is RZECZPOSPOLITA introduction]

[Text] Changes are taking place in the entire country designed to increase management effectiveness and fuller use of the existing materials and equipment potential. We are talking to Gen Div Henryk Szumski, commander of the Slask Military District, about the impact of this action on the armed forces.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Restructuring in the PRL armed forces is continuing. How is this process proceeding in the Slask OW [Military District]?

[Szumski] This represents the latest phase of the reorganization of our army. We have been attaching importance to lower costs, higher efficiency and effectiveness for a long time. We have conducted the certification and review of posts, and improvements in the dissemination of information are continuing as is the computerization of various areas of military activity.

The reorganization of structures in its essence has an economizing character as well. Older and uneconomical equipment is being withdrawn from use. We have reorganized the system of equipping the military or in simpler terms—the so-called empty processes have been eliminated.

In the beginning of March, two detachments in the district underwent reforms: the 1st Motorized Training Regiment in Olesnica and the 13th Warsaw Intermediate Tank regiment in Opole. These are units with a great

deal of accomplishments, with tradition and with extensive training. I am emphasizing this to give recognition to the soldiers of these detachments and at the same time, to once again confirm that what matters here are regiments processing important military potential. Currently, we are converting several regional defense and engineering-construction units in the district into civil defense detachments.

Within the framework of the present phase of restructuring, we are already implementing activity for the purpose of disassembling the 2nd Mechanized Division and reducing the composition of the 10th Sudetan Armored Division in Opole.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] What are the benefits to the national economy from this restructuring?

[Szumski] This can be looked at from many aspects. The less military and the more effective their structure, the smaller the burden on the state budget. I will make use of several examples here. After the dissolution of the regiment, the barracks in Olesnica will be turned over to the Voivodship People's Council in Wroclaw by the end of the year. There are several concepts on how to develop this functional facility. The buildings are, for example, suitable for a school or hospital whereas the garages and superbly equipped workshops—for a transport base.

Last year, we sold more than 1,000 automobiles that had been withdrawn from use. This year, we are planning to resell another 1,200 vehicles of all types and approximately 700 mobile repair workshops. There is great demand for the latter sold at auctions with priority given to the agricultural and forestry sectors. This high demand comes from the fact that the equipment is well made and outfitted, clean, well maintained, with good tires and technically well-functioning.

As a result of restructuring and decreased supply demands on our part, many military plants can take up the production of market goods. The Military Motorization Plans in Wroclaw, that are outside the SOW structure, are already earmarking nearly 40 percent of their production potential for the overhaul and repair of vehicles of the national economy. Without special outlays, a generally accessible diagnostic station has been placed in operation here. I will add—one that is enjoying great popularity. In addition, the nearby Military Communications Plants in Czernica are planning to enter into coproduction with Jelcz, Aspa and Elwro. They intend to engage nearly half of their potential in market production.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] As far as I know, these examples represent only part of the improvement strategies undertaken by the district....

[Szumski] For years the process of management improvement has been implemented in the district as it has been in all of the armed forces. It brings measurable effects. And thus, for example, last year their [effects] value exceeded 3.4 billion zloty. At the most recent 14th

Central Conference for the Efficient Management of the PRL Armed Forces, we presented a concrete list of achievements. Last year, the logistics services of our district held a lead position in the Polish Army. This outcome pleases us in particular because the sphere of logistics activity encompasses a wide ranging complex of economic activity. The food service and the agricultural-animal husbandry economic sector associated with it can boast good results. In comparison with 1987, last year's value of economic results in this service rose by more than 420 million zloty.

Such favorable results were obtained owing to, among other things, the cultivation of over 2,800 hectares of wasteland on the outskirts of [military] testing grounds where last fall we collected over 5,000 tons of grain and many hundreds of tons of other agricultural products. It suffices to say that our animal farming provides for the food needs of our soldiers in terms of meat consumption for more than 200 days out of the year. Other services also obtained favorable results. For example, economizing measures in the power and fuel sectors brought a savings to the order of 350 million zloty.

As a result of the application of innovative solutions, the consumption of liquid fuel decreased whereas the new solutions placed in practice enabled along with these savings to carry on a proper course of military training.

Only in the automobile-tank service did the savings obtained from the sound use of military technology come to more than 40 million zloty.

The quarters allocation and construction service which, for example, by changing the organization of the construction base lowered the costs associated with this by

20 percent, can boast of many such economizing results. As a result of concentrating the work, entire implementation cycles have been shortened in 22 tasks of 1,130 days. In the activity of the uniform service, the improvement of work organization in military laundries, which made it possible to perform services for the civilian health service and for socialized establishments, deserves special emphasis.

Inventors and innovators play a significant role in our economizing endeavors. Nearly 5,000 cadre members, basic military service soldiers, officer cadets from the Reserves Military Colleges and military employees take part in the district's inventiveness and innovativeness movement. The effects obtained from the application of their proposals come to approximately a half billion zloty. Many of these innovative ideas can be applied in the national economy. For example, the proposal made by Zygmunt Wawer from the quarters allocation and construction service is worthy of attention. This concerns an inexpensive and simple method of heating the walls of buildings. There are also others, such as the proposal submitted by the workers of the Wroclaw Garrisoned Housing Administration of a method of washing central heating installations. Many ideas pertain to repairs and replacement parts of one's own production. The introduction and application of these proposals fills 10 percent of our district's annual materiel and technological needs.

These are just some of the examples of our activity that prove that we have a unanimous understanding of the military restructuring process: with a lower number of military forces and a smaller budget we are trying to conduct our operations more effectively and economically.

## INTRABLOC

### USSR, GDR Cooperate in Food-Processing Research

18260018a Alma-Ata FREUNDSCHAFT in German  
13 Jun 89 p 4

[Article by Robert Korn, FREUNDSCHAFT correspondent: "New Prospects for Scientific Cooperation"]

[Text] The Dzhambul Technological Institute for Light Industry and the Food Industry was established 25 years ago. In the course of these years, the college has earned a good reputation in the field of the training of cadres for the light industry and the food industry. The five departments of the college train highly qualified chemists, technologists, engineers, mechanics, economists and bookkeepers.

The institute's faculty has always endeavored to incorporate the results of scientific research in teaching and production. The institute's Alma-Ata branch alone managed in 1988 to transfer seven items to production. Their total profits amounted to 399.85 rubles.

Prof Dr Woldemar Mueller, rector of the college, was recently a guest of our editorial board. He said: "The incorporation in the teaching process of the research results achieved by our institute's professors and lecturers is one of the most important prerequisites for its optimalization. My particular field of research is that of the chemistry of solids, in other words the science of materials. I am specially preoccupied with supra performance, a quite new field. My research relates to the work of scholars at the Dresden Technical University where I defended my dissertation. I personally find cooperation with GDR scientists most rewarding. I am convinced that it will also benefit our college as well as the universities and Alma-Ata and Dresden."

When visiting with our editorial board, Prof Dr Woldemar Mueller was accompanied by his colleagues Prof Dr Heinrich Oppermann of Dresden Technical University, Jonart Wagner, deputy director of the Alma-Ata branch of the Dzhambul Technological Institute for Light Industry and the Food Industry and a candidate for a technical sciences degree, and Nemeribai Nurakhmetov, professor of anorganic chemistry at the Kazakhstan State Kirov University.

Prof Dr Heinrich Oppermann is not only a teacher and scholar but also a member of many scientific bodies in the GDR. He has a wealth of experience in the field of cooperation with various institutions of higher education in our country. He has visited the USSR on many occasions and is personally acquainted with several Soviet scholars. Professor Oppermann told us that "It has been quite a long time since we took up close scientific contacts with Soviet colleges. In the field of vanadium oxides, for example, we are collaborating with the Joffe Institute in Leningrad. Our scientific relations with the Novosibirsk Institute for Anorganic Chemistry, also, have yielded

intensive collaboration. Now we are having an opportunity to establish scientific contacts with the chemical faculty of the Kazakh State Kirov University and the Dzhambul Technological Institute for Light Industry and the Food Industry. We hope that our future cooperation will yield new stimuli for discussions and research, that we will reciprocally fructify scholarly ideas. Such relations help along our work and linguistic knowledge. Moreover, they contribute to international understanding, something that is of equal value with scientific results. It is most important to involve students in this cooperation, because the exchange of young people outside our own borders is of the greatest significance for the resolution of scholarly problems. Initially, though, we need to ascertain workers in the respective fields. After that we will begin the exchange of students."

Obviously new problems arise in connection with the developing scholarly cooperation. Attitudes to this collaboration vary. Some senior officials, for instance, have no experience in this field and do not appreciate the evident reciprocal benefits.

The exchange of students has little to do with tourism. It involves work for scientific purposes and can be organized successfully only if the young people have the proper linguistic knowledge. It is therefore of primary importance to established purposeful and thorough language teaching.

The Kazakh State University and the Dzhambul Technological Institute for Light Industry and the Food Industry are very interested indeed in scholarly cooperation with the Dresden Technical University, and that interest guarantees the creation of the necessary conditions. The editorial board hopes very soon to be able to report the first successes in the field of scientific collaboration between researchers from Alma-Ata and Dzhambul on the one hand and their Dresden colleagues on the other.

## HUNGARY

### Lack of Schools Prompts Children To Work

25000301b Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian  
10 May 89 p 5

[Article by Robert Gal: "Starting To Work at 14; Too Many Eighth-Graders; Many Cannot Continue Studies"]

[Text] We call the attention of the government and the council to the following story which we received earlier this week. In the counties of Hajdu, Szabolcs-Szatmar, and Győr-Sopron, at the close of school admission appeals there were about 3,000 youngsters who wished to continue their studies, but (at least for the time being) are prevented from doing so.

We have been saying for years, and realizing for a long time, that when a large number of youngsters leave the elementary grades, their continuing education, placement, and employment present severe worries. However,



financial restrictions can torpedo even the most thoroughly considered calculations. Currently there is hardly any money to build or enlarge schools. Average class size in our secondary schools will be cruelly large (for students and teachers alike) during the next school year. At times it will be as high as 35-40 students.

#### Uneducated Tradesmen?

In Sopron, for example, even though last year they dedicated a new trade school and this September they will introduce auxiliary classes in certain commercial schools, only 20 of the planned 32 classrooms are ready, because the money ran out. The other 12 classrooms which, based on the nearly ideal class size of 30, would be able to accommodate an additional 360 students, simply was not built; even though they are severely needed. In the Fenyo Square elementary school 12 percent, in the Ferenczy Road school 8 percent, and in the Orsolya Square 10-12 percent of the eighth-graders still have no idea if they could continue their studies or have to start working, learn a trade at their places of employment, or even delay their continuing studies.

I am looking at a skinny boy in the dark corridor of the prestigious downtown school on Orsolya Square. The school coat appears to hang on him.

"I am Gabor Pinter, from the A section of the eighth grade," he says. "I was not accepted at any school. For a year I will work with my father in the textile industry. I will work 4 hours a day. Afterwards, we will see what happens. I would like to apply to a school where the admission is easier."

Andrea Arpas only tried to get into commercial and restaurant trade schools, but in vain. "I will also work, as a seamstress, which is what my mother is doing. But I am not sure if this will work out," she looks at me with uncertainty. I can see from her eyes that she is forced to follow this course.

#### The Beginning Unemployed

"My parents and I are equally without answers," continues Marton Horvath, shifting from one foot to the other. "I do not know whom or what we can trust. Right now I feel like continuing my studies; later, I am not sure I will feel the same."

True, there are many eighth-graders, and competition for the better occupations is great. The frequently mentioned confusion in occupational prestige (the up- and down-grading of certain professions), the chronic existence of occupational shortages and the well known limitations on the schooling of girls have become even more evident in our time.

"Until now there was hardly anyone among our graduates who could not continue studying at the school of their choice," said Imelda Horvath, director of the elementary school on the Orsolya Square, then she shows me the rejection letter from one of the agricultural trade

schools. "This year, the situation is quite different. In spite of all our efforts, 17 of the 128 eighth-graders face uncertain futures. Our school is attended primarily by the children of parents who work in downtown Sopron; and, unfortunately, I cannot quiet many of them."

"We are trying to remedy unrealistic career choices, but that is not enough," adds Imre Azsboth, the school's career counselor. "Students with poor grades find themselves in a much worse situation now than their counterparts a few years ago. If we cannot help them on an institutional basis, they will inevitably sink, and within 2-3 months will become unemployed. We realize now how difficult it is to choose a life profession at age 14."

#### Between School and Workplace: Children

The teacher refers to the importance of institutional assistance, and we must wholeheartedly agree with him. So I ask Dr Peter Szalay, the director of the town council's employment division, whether his office knows that there are a great many eighth-graders this year, and chances for continuing study are limited, which will sooner or later result in employment tensions.

"There have been other times, too, when a certain number of children were not accepted at any school. This is not a problem of employment, but one of education. Our basic consideration is the previous years' demand for labor force. The textile industry welcomes the youngsters, and will even consider offering them a chance to continue their schooling. If there is a need, and if there are enough people who sign up, we will organize retraining sessions," answers the director of employment.

I am not quite that optimistic. On the contrary, knowing the debates raging between those who are in charge of our educational and employment policies, I can see and feel that there are problems with the timely recognition of problems and the development of collaboration. And this is hardly conducive to efficiently organizing the forms of institutional assistance, such as training in matters related to the labor force market. And, of course, as far as the children's future goes, this is only a partial solution.

### POLAND

#### ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE 'Briefs' Columns

26000548 Warsaw ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE in Polish  
4, 11 Jun 89 p 2

[Excerpts from weekly news roundup column "Last Week"]

[Excerpts]

[No 23, 4 Jun 89 p 2]

#### In Poland

[Passage omitted] On 2 June 1989, Wojciech Jaruzelski appeared on Polish Television and said that, among other

things, today a breakthrough in the economy and more rapid improvement of society's material living conditions are the most important and urgent. All sociopolitical forces, both those that exist today and those that form in the course of further, pluralist evolution, must aim their activities in that direction. The chairman of the Council of State called for the formation of a broad postelection coalition, a pact to reform the economy, to enrich democracy, to strengthen the state, and to develop Poland.

Premier Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski has decided to halt production damaging the environment at the Chemitex-Celwiskoza Chemical Fibers Plant in Jelenia Gora and to change the industry of the plant beginning 1 January 1990. He also signed a decree of the Council of Ministers establishing free trade zones in Darlowo, Kolobrzeg, Szczecin, Swinoujscie, Goleniow, Kolbaskow, Gryfice, Wroclaw-Popowice, Kedzierzyn-Koziel, and Gliwice. He also established a free trade zone in Ustka.

"In June 1989, every retiree and pensioner receiving a retirement, invalid pension, or family pension will receive 30,000 zloty as an advance on a supplemental calculation of pensions and retirements to begin in July 1989," said Michal Czariski, minister of labor and social policy. The recalculation implemented in September (the Social Security Agency cannot carry it out by the deadline) will raise retirements and pensions by at least the same amount by which wages increased during the first half of 1989. Further, the level of the increases will be increased from 150 to 250 percent of the increase in wages.

On 1 June 1989, the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers met in Zamosc with Deputy Premier Ireneusz Sekula presiding. The main item at the meeting was a discussion of the regionalization of agricultural policy in areas where the largest number of gminas with the most difficult farming conditions, the most rapid loss of agricultural land, and the highest emigration out of rural areas. There are 350 such gminas in the 39 north-eastern and eastern regions of Poland and along the western border. In order to stimulate activity in these areas, there are plans to develop, among other things, production services, planned fruit growing, and tourism.

On 1 June 1989, an initial agreement between Barbara Piasecka-Johnson, acting in the name of the Barbara Piasecka-Johnson Gdansk Shipyard Company, Ltd. of New Jersey, and Director Czeslaw Tolwinski, representing the shipyard, was signed at the Gdansk Shipyard. The agreement creates a limited-liability partnership. Lech Walesa also signed the agreement.

A decision has been made to shut down two lines in the ore sintering plant, the so-called agglomerating plant of the Lenin Steelworks. The No 3 large furnace, and the so-called tandem furnace, in use in the Martin furnace section will also be shut down. This facility will be put to different uses. The slag-steel processing line will also be closed. It is estimated that as a result of these actions the works will reduce its annual emissions of particulates by 5,150 tons, of sulfur dioxide by 1,600 tons, of nitrogen oxides by 1,460

tons, hydrocarbons by 630 tons, fluorine by 6 tons, and carbon monoxide by 61,650 tons. The economic benefits to the works will amount to 3 billion zloty in 1989.

The Polish Foundation for Personnel Promotion has been formed. It is to train personnel, create conditions for developing predispositions and management abilities, help in advancement, prepare competitions, follow careers, popularize successful people, organize international cooperation in the development of personnel, and promote the idea of the modern manager.

The Lodz People's Council and the Lodz PRON Council in a secret ballot on the performance of the plan and budget for 1988 refused to accept the report of the president of Lodz, Jaroslaw Pietrzyk. The People's Council was unusually critical of the performance of the plan in housing construction (about 74 percent) and of the performance in retail trade, and it accused the authorities of having no initiatives to support the development of local production of building materials.

The Warsaw Voivodship Court received an appeal of the decision refusing registration of the Independent Association of Students to the Supreme Court from that organization.

On 31 May 1989, the All-Polish Strike Committee of the Independent Association of Students decided to suspend the strike action which it is conducting at 43 higher schools in Poland.

To ensure a rational market for strawberries and forest ground cover, the Ministry for Foreign Economic Cooperation has decided to include the export of privately raised strawberries and mushrooms in export allowances in 1989. Previously, the blanket permits had been rescinded. There are plans to permit total exports of 15,000 tons of strawberries and about 200,000 tons of mushrooms.

#### Abroad

Units of the Chinese army, as part of the state of emergency, took over Tiananmen Square, on which several thousands students had been conducting an occupational strike in support of democratization and freedom. The number of deaths is significant. [passage omitted]

In Prague, the conference of the government members responsible for ecological issues of the countries bordering Czechoslovakia (Hungary, the GDR, the People's Republic of Poland, Austria, the FRG, and the Soviet Union) held at the initiative of CSSR Premier Ladislav Adamec ended with the adoption of a final memorandum. Representatives of the European Community, the CEMA, and the UN Economic Commission for Europe participated. Although the conference involved some controversies (among others, Austria expressed serious concern due to Czechoslovakia's program to develop nuclear power), it demonstrated the great need for this type of meeting, especially in this part of Europe. In the memorandum, the participants in the meeting say that

environmental protection should be given comprehensive priority treatment. The participants are to present the results of the meeting to their governments, whose premiers, according to the Czechoslovak invitation are to participate in an "ecological summit" in Prague.

The first deputy chairmen of the CSSR State Planning Commission, Ladislav Supka and Vaclav Vertelar, announced that the government recently adopted plans for the economic development of Czechoslovakia through 2005. The central variant of the plan, which after modifications will become the basic road map for the socioeconomic development of Czechoslovakia, calls for serious structural changes: reduction of the number of inefficient enterprises and maintenance of the supply of energy at the current level of 108-110 million tons of standard fuel annually. In conjunction with this, the consumption of energy by industry must be reduced by 32 percent. Employment in industry and agriculture is to be reduced in favor of services, which is to employ 50 percent of the population in 2005.

Talks on the Cuban debt between Cuba and its major creditors grouped together in the Club of Paris were held in Paris at the end of May; however, the talks produced no concrete results. Cuba's debt to public and private Western creditors totals about \$6.45 billion according to the Cuba's central bank. Western financial circles estimate that Cuba's debt to the Soviet Union is triple this figure. [passage omitted]

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[Excerpts]

#### In Poland

[Passage omitted] According to a review done by the State Election Commission, by 18 May, the voivodship election commissions had registered 558 candidates for the senate and the district commissions had registered 1,760 candidates for deputy seats. Including the candidates nominated on the national list, the number of candidates totals 2,353. There are four candidates on average for each deputy seat and nearly 6 for each senate seat, although there is significant variation among districts. The largest number of candidates for the senate is 32 in Warsaw. [passage omitted]

On 26 May in Gdansk the Executive Commission of the NSZZ Solidarity met with Lech Walesa presiding. It discussed, among other things, financial matters. In 1988, Solidarity spent 6.18 percent for aid (for repressed individuals, those in hiding, families of the imprisoned, etc), 15.35 percent for publications, 18.73 percent on organizational expenses, 2.57 percent on subsidies (for the NSZZ RI "S" [Rural Solidarity], the Independent Association of Students, Peace and Freedom, independent associations, self-managements, pupil organizations, etc.), 38.51 percent for strike funds, 7.8 percent for miscellaneous items. The union still had 10.86 percent of its income.

During the night of 27-28 May, the new train schedule for the Polish State Railways went into effect. Express trains were added (30 percent), including the Giewont from Warsaw to Zakopane, the Brda from Warsaw to Bydgoszcz, and the Poseidon from Warsaw to Wladyslawowo and trains to localities in the USSR (70 percent). The remaining local and long-distance schedule was only slightly changed.

On 24 May, the Sejm met. Economic issues dominated the deliberations. [passage omitted]

The Voivodship Court in Warsaw at its session of 23 May issued a decision denying registration to the Independent Association of Students. The cause of the denial is the phrase in the charter on the right to strike. The Solidarity Citizens' Committee declared that the decision is not justified by the law, politically harmful, threatens the foundations of academic freedom, and contradicts the results of the roundtable. In protest, the students began occupational strikes at several higher schools throughout Poland.

The president of the Agency for Foreign Investment issued 118 decisions on the formation of joint ventures between 16 January and 19 May 1989. The largest number of interested parties comes from the FRG (60), including West Berlin, then Austria (10), the United States (8), and Sweden and Great Britain (7 each). Their capital contributions amount to 33 billion zloty; by the end of 1988, 52 joint ventures with a total capital of 10 billion zloty had been formed. At present, 200 industrialists are seeking permits. Hubert Janiszewski, deputy president of the agency, estimates that by December there will be 400 to 500 of these enterprises active in Poland. [passage omitted]

On 23 May 1989, a second Boeing 767 leased by LOT Polish Airlines landed at Okecie in Warsaw. It is called Krakow and will fly between Warsaw and Chicago.

On 22 May 1989, the 34th International Book Fair ended in Warsaw. About 1,000 exhibitors participated, including, for the first time, emigree and second-circulation publishers. Contracts with the socialist countries estimated at 5 million rubles and with Western countries at \$1.3 million (included in this sum is \$1 million from the government for the purchase of recent scientific and technical literature) were signed.

#### Abroad

[Passage omitted] Representatives of Poland and Hungary will participate for the first time in a meeting of the ministers of the member states of the Council of Europe. For now, they will participate as "observers."

The correspondent for RZECZPOSPOLITA reports that five days after the end of the second round of negotiations between Poland and the EEC on an agreement on trade and commerce, the Council of Ministers of the Community made an important decision. It agreed to proposals made during the talks by the Polish side. The proposals

amount to a demand to remove all limitations hampering exports from Poland to the EEC market, now and in the future, to establish a calendar of all limitations, and to introduce measures facilitating Polish agricultural and food exports. In these negotiations, Poland desires mutual trade based on the normal principles for GATT members. The opportunity to take advantage of credits from the European Investment Bank is unprecedented, at least in EEC relations with CEMA countries. It shows that the European Community is aware that Poland's cooperation with the West is a prerequisite for overcoming the crisis in Poland's economy. The most recent decision by the EEC, like the declaration of the ministers of foreign affairs in Luxembourg on 24 April 1989 and earlier, is tied to the political and economic changes in Poland and to the decisions of the roundtable. The specific decisions to provide Poland with credits are to be discussed during the next few days by experts at the Luxembourg office of the Investment Bank. [passage omitted]

In an interview with several West European journalists, President George Bush confirmed the American commitment to Europe and emphasized that the United States is interested in maintaining peace on the continent. He is not visiting Poland and Hungary in order to "create problems for Gorbachev," but simply in order to accent "support for the wave of freedom sweeping over the world." The American president said that he is a supporter of "Eastern Europe making a more independent, freer choice of its own path," but at the same time, he excludes the possibility of concluding an agreement in

the style of a "new Yalta," a so-called guarantee of security in exchange for greater freedom for the countries of Eastern Europe.

Three Soviet and five West European banks have formed a new bank with offices in Moscow, whose purpose is to finance joint industrial undertakings and commerce between the West and the USSR. The five Western banks (the Banca Commerciale Italiana, the Bayerische Vereinsbank from the FRG, the Credit Lyonnais from France, the Creditanstalt Bankverein from Austria, and the Kansallis-Osake-Pankki from Finland) will hold 12 percent each or 60 percent of the total capital of the new bank. The Soviet banks, including the Vneshekonombank, Promstroybank, and the Sberbank will have a total of 40 percent, of which 20 percent will go to the first of them and 20 percent to the other two. The initial capital of the bank is 100 million rubles (\$66 million). In addition to undertakings of an international character, the bank is also to provide financing and promote currency exchange in the Soviet Union. The third area of its operations is in the international currency exchange markets and in the international commercial paper markets.

The commission of the Presidium of Serbia for economic reform, under Slobodan Milosevic has proposed a national "loan for the rebirth of the economy" of the republic of \$1 billion and 2 billion dinars (about \$150 million). The economy of Serbia has for some time been struggling with insufficient investment funding. [passage omitted]

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